Over
the past two years or so, land has stormed onto the Southern African
regional agenda, thanks largely to developments in Zimbabwean land
reform. The media in particular (regionally and internationally) has
latched onto these developments, overwhelmingly with a negative
sentiment. This negativity has largely clouded the real situation,
and obscured important and valid grievances - namely the unresolved
land issue which underpins much of the structural inequality
characteristic of the country (and in fact the broader region).

This
short paper sets out to provide a broad sketch of the land question
in Zimbabwe. It starts with a short introduction to the history of
colonisation, before focussing in greater detail on processes of land
reform during the post-independence period (i.e. post-1980). The
paper is essentially descriptively outlining the approaches used,
although it does provide some analysis of the problems associated
with market-assisted reforms and how these have influenced the nature
of land policy over the past two decades. The paper does not enter
into discussion on whether the politicisation of the land issue by
ZANU-PF's is altruistic and ideological in nature, or simply the
pursuit of self-preservation. The more detailed analysis to follow
this study will delve into this matter.

Finally,
this paper is by no means exhaustive and it contains many omissions
and gaps. It really only scratches the surface of what is a complex
issue.. However, this document highlights some key aspects of land
and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe..

2.
Background to the Land Question in Zimbabwe

2.1.
Colonisation: The British South Africa Company

Although
there are many similarities in relation to the history of land in
South Africa and Zimbabwe, the underlying conditions are different.
Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwean colonisation only started in the
1890's, when the 'pioneer column' of John Cecil Rhodes crossed north
over the Limpopo. This movement north of European settlers was
spurred-on by massive gold discoveries on the Rand (now
Johannesburg) in South Africa in the 1870's. 'Gold hunger' led mining
capital to explore for further rich gold fields. These explorations
penetrated as far inland as the Zimbabwe highlands, where gold was
indeed discovered.

The
British South Africa Company (BSA) - a commercial company - had
obtained concessions from the British Crown to further the
exploitation of minerals in the region. The Company sponsored the
settlement of Europeans at what was then Fort Salisbury (now Harare),
where land was -separated and laid out as farms. It needs to be noted
that the BSA did not set out to govern or rule the territory. It's
sole objective was to seek and generate profit from the natural
resources discovered there. Unfortunately, profits were not to be,
since the gold discovered in Zimbabwe was not concentrated in reefs
(as in South Africa), but rather was scattered and almost impossible
to extract profitably. In fact, even after three decades the company
never generated any profit.

As a
result of the company being unable to profit from gold exploitation,
the BSA encouraged white settlement for farming purposes. This was
seen as an alternative means of generating income for the company. As
a result of this policy however, there was a greater need to
dispossess indigenous peoples of even more land, and coercively force
them into labour on settler farms.

Within
the first decade of European settlement in Zimbabwe, African people
rebelled against the forced alienation of their lands. The first
'Chimurenga' erupted in 1896 as locals attempted through armed
struggle to drive the settlers out, and to reclaim their territory.
This rebellion lasted until1897, but ultimately failed as Africans
were defeated by European weaponry.

The
Zimbabwean highlands, much like the highlands in South African,
lands, are not particularly fertile, and thus farming was not an easy
or profitable enterprise. As a result, white settler farmers
struggled continuously through the early decades of the 20^th

Century.

2.2.
Settler Consolidation: The emergence of a British Colony proper

By
1923 the BSA Company wanted out of the territory. Profits had
remained elusive over the past three decades. As a result, an
election/referendum was held for white settlers only to determine the
future of the territory. Settlers were required to vote for one of
three choices: to become a part of the Union of South Africa; to
become a full British colony; or to go for self-governance (an
autonomous British colony). Settlers opted for the self-governance
route.

Shortly
after the election/referendum the Morris-Carter Commission of 1925
was established to set out a framework for ensuring the emergence of
Rhodesia as a self-sustaining white colony. The Commission proposed
landholding patterns to put the settler economy on a sound footing.
This was followed by the Land Appointment Act of 1930, which
separated land along racial lines (both in terms of quality and
quantity). Race groups were not allowed to acquire land in areas
designated for other races. This land structure has largely carried
through into the post-independence period.

In
terms of the Land Appointment Act, 50.8 per cent of the land was
reserved for white settlers, with the bulk of it on the arable
central highlands. The indigenous African population (the majority of
the population) was allocated 30 per cent of the land. This 30 per
cent was largely on the plateau sloping down into the Zambezi Valley,
and in the mountainous Escarpment regions. This land was designated
as African Reserve Areas (now known as communal areas). The remaining
20 per cent of the land was either owned by commercial companies or
the colonial government (Crown Land), or was reserved as conservation
areas. A further, very small area (0.05 per cent), the Native
Purchase Areas, allowed the acquisition of land (through freehold or
leasehold) by richer Africans or small groups of African people.

It
does need to be noted that the size of land available for Africans
did expand between 1930 and 1980. By Zimbabwean independence, the
racial split in land ownership/access was approximately 40% for each
group (i.e. white holdings were reduced from 51 to 40 per cent, and
African land expanded from 30 to 40 per cent). Population densities
in white and African areas were however vastly different (with far
greater numbers of people living on African land). This situation
still prevails today.

It is
important to note however, that not only did white settlers have the
pick of land in the best agro-ecological regions of the country, but
were also supported by massive state intervention in the development
of the farming economy. Thus, the colonial state provided extensive
communication and marketing infrastructure in commercial farming
areas, and made subsidies and loans available to white farmers.

At the
time, there was a definite wage hierarchy in the sub-region, which
corresponded largely to differing levels of capital development in
Southern Africa. Within this hierarchy, South African wages for
migrant labourers were the highest (followed by Zimbabwe and then
Malawi). As a result, labour migration in the sub-region had a
southward tendency. This posed problems in terms of labour supply to
the emerging white colony in Zimbabwe, where (as the white economy
grew) the need to 'keep' local African labour grew more urgent. As a
result, various measures were put in place, including a labour supply
commission; limiting access by South African recruitment companies;
the use of migrant labour from Malawi; and the setting of limits on
the number of Zimbabweans allowed to leave the colony.

As
a consequence of increasing population densities in the communal
areas, and the social and economic dislocation associated with labour
migration from these areas, by the post-war period there was
increasing environmental degradation and a growing production crisis.
This was compounded by the massive eviction of African labour off
white farms at that time (in response to increasing mechanisation of
commercial agriculture). As a result, in 1951 the Native Land
Husbandry Act was passed. Central to this legislation (and also
common to many other British colonies in Africa at the time) was the
limiting of stock numbers and the introduction of soil and water
conservation methods and technology (for example, terracing). The
betterment schemes in South Africa's reserves from the 1930's and
onward were in a similar vein, and in response to a similar
environmental and production crisis.

The
outcome of this institutionalised segregation and structured
subordination of indigenous peoples is reflected in data from the
1960's, including population densities, average wages and educational
expenditure by race:

Table
1 Racial inequality in 1960's Rhodesia

(Source: Moyo,
2001; Mbaya, 2001)

It
is therefore not surprising that the iniquities and inequalities of
land allocation, and the associated state support to white
agriculture were continuous areas of conflict and contention. As
noted earlier, the first rebellion by indigenous peoples was fuelled
by these grievances. In the mid-1960's, the second Chimurengabegan,
led by ZANU and ZAPU. Both of these liberation movements were
committed to radical land reform on coming to power. The
dispossession of Africans was still very much a living memory for
many of the elders in Zimbabwe who had lived through . the first
Chimurenga. As a result, ZANU and ZAPU elicited much peasant support,
and the war was thus fought largely in rural areas. Trade unions and
civil organisations were not involved.Rather, it was guerrilla
fighters and peasants who battled against a modern army of the white
regime. It was a struggle for land on the land.

The
civil war lasted for nearly two decades before negotiations for a
settlement were initiated in the late-1970's. The inequalities in
Zimbabwe at that time were still very stark. Population densities in
the communal areas were three times those in commercial farming
areas. There was still a highly visible racial division of land, with
6000 white farmers owning approximately 42 per cent of the country

2.3.
Independence: The Lancaster House Agreement

In
terms of seeking a resolution to the crisis in Zimbabwe at the time,
the land reform experience of Kenya was influential. As with
Zimbabwe, Kenya had had a comparable land problem and a guerrilla war
fuelled by land grievances. In the case of Kenya, the British sought
to defuse the situation by buying out white farmers. The British made
available UK£ 500 million for land acquisition and settlement
support in Kenya. It was hoped that a similar solution could be found
for Zimbabwe. Thus, during the secret negotiations in the
mid-1970's, the notion of an Anglo-American Development Fund for
Zimbabwe was promoted. The endowment" received broad support
(including backing from the then ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front). This
fund, to which the British agreed to contribute UK£ 75 million,
would be used to buy out farms owned by whites. At the time, the US
hinted it would contribute an extra $200 million to the fund.
However, as we will see in the following pages, this Fund failed to
materialise.

In
1979, the Lancaster House negotiations started. By the time these
negotiations took place there had been a change in government in the
UK. During Lancaster, the Development Fund, which had been moot in
previous discussions, was used as 'bait' to get the liberation
movements to reach an agreement with the Rhodesian authorities. In
the end however, the offer of the Fund was withdrawn, and instead the
UK government offered a compromise solution. In exchange for
guaranteeing existing property rights in the new Zimbabwe, the UK
would underwrite half of the costs of resettlement. The Zimbabwe
government had to match that funding to make up the full costs of the
programme. In 1980, the UK pledged an initial amount of UK£ 20
million.

Land
would thus change hands through a willing seller/willing buyer
mechanism, with white farmers who wanted to continue farming being
free to do so. There would be no mass expropriation of land by the
new post-colonial state. The state did retain the right to
expropriate for public and resettlement purposes, but in such cases
compensation had to be paid out in foreign currency. In the end,
following pressure from the frontline states, ZANU/ZAPU conceded and
accepted the settlement. The restrictions imposed by Lancaster were
to remain in place for 10 years.

As
a result of this "crucial capitulation" (Palmer,
1990:166), the hands of the new Zimbabwean government were
effectively tied in relation to agrarian transformation, and
effectively ruled out any significant redistribution of land.
Compounding these restrictions was the fact that following the war
there was an urgent need for reconstruction, and measures to address
mass displacement and the collapse of peasant production. Moreover,
as a result of the collapse of peasant agriculture, 90 per cent of
the countries marketed food requirements were being produced by white
farmers. This ironically placed white farmers in a strong position
(economically and politically) at the end of the war. The
restrictions imposed through the Lancaster House agreement remained a
constant theme in Zimbabwean land reform in the decades following
independence.

3.
Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe²

The
aim of land reform in post-independence Zimbabwe was to redress past
land alienation through promoting equal access to land for the
majority of the population. The aims of the programme were:

(i) To create
political stability and an acceptable property rights regime;

(ii) To promote economic growth
through wider equity and efficiency gains from land redistribution;
and

(iii) To promote national food
security, self-sufficiency and agricultural development through
labour intensive small farmer production, optimal land productivity,
and returns to capital invested.

The
land reform programme was targeted at the landless; war veterans; the
poor; and commercial farm workers.

The
target for resettlement on land acquired by the state changed a
number of times in the first two years of independence. In 1980 the
stated target was 18 000 households over five years. This changed in
1981 to 54 000 households before finally, in 1982, the target was
fixed at 162 000 households (to be resettled by 1984 if possible).
This final target has stuck, and proved to be a millstone around the
government's neck.

Land
acquisition was aimed at reducing the 16 million hectares of
agricultural land held by white farmers at independence by
approximately 50 per cent. The target set for land acquisition and
transfer to black small landholders was thus approximately 8 million
hectares. The remaining white commercial farming areas would also be
desegregated through promoting black entry into the sector.

The
Land Reform and Resettlement Programme of the Zimbabwean government
can be seen as comprising two phases: the first phase from 1980 to
1996, and the second commencing with the gazetting of 1471 farms for
compulsory acquisition in 1997.

3.1.
State-Centred Market-Based Land Reform: 1980 to 1996

•State
centred land reform

The
dominant approach to land acquisition in the 1981-1996 period can be
characterised as a state-centred market-based approach to land
redistribution. Land was purchased by the state from willing sellers
(as per Lancaster) and redistributed to beneficiaries³.
The private sector led the identification of land and controlled the
supply available for resettlement, with the government being a
reactive buyer. The government made land available to people selected
mainly by its district officials under the direct supervision of
central government officials.

As a
consequence, land reform in Zimbabwe during the 1980's and 1990's has
been unable to redistribute land on any significant scale. Instead,
reform has been confined to the planned and orderly settlement of
beneficiaries (families and cooperatives) on land acquired by the
state.

Acquisition
of land through the willing-seller set-up was relatively easy during
the 1981 to 1983 period, with a substantial supply of farms abandoned
during the war, and farms coming on to the market as white settlers
left after independence. However, after this period the supply of
land dried up. This may well have been the motivation behind the Land
Acquisition Act of 1986, which provided the state with first option
to farms coming onto the market. The Act also provided for compulsory
acquisition of land deemed under-utilised or derelict (although this
approach was never successfully pursued during the first phase of
land reform in Zimbabwe).

Settlement
of beneficiaries on land took place through one of four models
(although the bulk of reform took place through only one):

(i)

Intensive settlement on an individual family basis (MODEL A)

In
this model, beneficiaries receive cropping land (of 10 to 65 Ha) as
well as access to communal grazing land (of 55 Ha or equivalent
depending on the agro-ecological region). Land was acquired by the
state (usually in the form of large commercial estates) with plots
being redistributed to beneficiaries. Tenure (on the part of
beneficiaries) was in the form of three annual permits – one
for settlement, one for cultivation, and one for grazing. A final
point is that settlers (beneficiaries) had to give up their rights
to land in the trust/communal areas they came from. The bulk of land
reform (over 80 per cent) in the 1980's and 1990's took place
through this model.

(ii)
Village settlement with cooperative farming (MODEL B)

Model
B was designed to take over existing large commercial farms, with
farm production then being cooperatively organised (with
decision-making through committee). Credit would be accessed by the
cooperative, and income allocated either to individual families or
allocated for farm development. Approximately 50 of these
cooperative schemes were set up, although many subsequently folded.

(iii)
State farms with out-growers (MODEL C)

This
model involved the intensive resettlement of beneficiaries around a
core estate. The estate provided settlers with certain services, and
settlers in turn provide labour for the estate. Cropping land within
this scheme was allocated on an individual basis, with settlers also
gaining access to grazing land, which is managed communally. A
professional farm manager manages the core estate. This model was
not extensively implemented.

(iv)
Commercial grazing for communal areas (MODEL D)

Under
Model D (which was implemented in the arid south of Zimbabwe),
commercial ranches were purchased next to communal land. Livestock
was then purchased from these neighbouring trust areas and allowed
to fatten on the ranch before being sold. The thinking was that this
would enable communal farmers to reduce grazing pressure on communal
lands. This model was not extensively implemented.

On the
whole, land allocations through the Zimbabwean land reform programme
have been generous as compared to other African countries such as
Kenya. This is partly due to the fact that the programme was modelled
on the extensive land use patterns characteristic of the (white)
commercial sector. The down side of this is that less people have
been able to benefit from land redistribution (i.e. the number of
potential beneficiaries is reduced).

By
June 1989, approximately 52 000 households (or 416 000 people) had
been resettled, on approximately 2.8 million hectares of land
acquired by the state for resettlement. This represented
approximately 16 per cent the commercial farmland at independence.⁴
In 1989, there were 4319 black and white commercial farmers occupying
approximately 29 per cent of the land. By 2000, the amount of land
redistributed had increased to approximately 3.5 million hectares,
and the number of beneficiaries to approximately 75 000 households. A
further 400 000 hectares of state land had been leased out to 400
African commercial farmers, and a further 350 farms had been
purchased by Africans on the open market.

The
acquisition of land was however not evenly spread out over time. The
process was

extremely
uneven as is illustrated in Table 2 below.

Table 2 Land purchased for resettlement: 1980/1981 - 1987/1988

FINANCIAL YEAR	LAND (Ha)
1980/1981	223 196
1981/1982	900 196
1982/1983	939 925
1983/1984	159 866
1984/1985	75 058
1985/1986	85 167
1986/1987	133 515
1987/1988	20 319
TOTAL (1988)	2 538 262
TOTAL (1989)	2 713 725
TOTAL (2000)	approx. 3 500 000

(Source:
Palmer, 1990. Modified)

From
the data, it is obvious that in addition to uneven progress, there
has been a general slow-down in progress of the programme over time
as well. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure
1 Land Acquisition: 1980 to 2000

There
are a number of factors that have contributed to the imbalance
observed in the programme, as well as the general slow-down in land
redistribution over time:

(i)
from 1980/1981 to 1982/1983 there was a massive spurt of
redistribution made up largely of farms abandoned during the war or
shortly before or after independence;

(ii)
after 1983 few whole farms came onto the market, which made advance
planning on the part of the government difficult. Moreover, farmers
held onto their core productive land and sold of marginal holdings.
This was especially the case as land prices began to rise due
largely to post-war political stability;

(iii)
white farmers wanting to sell land were legally obliged to offer it
to the state first. If the state did not want the land, it would
issue a 'no present interest' certificate (valid for one year),
which then enabled the seller to dispose of the land on the private
market. According to Palmer (1990), throughout the 1980's at least
there was a consistent oversupply of land available to the state.
Many of the new black elite and senior members of the government
were able to acquire farms through taking advantage of the state's
'no present interest'. According to Palmer (1990), farm land
totalling over a million hectares transferred hands in this way.

(iv)
the role of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) cannot be overlooked
in examining the pace of land reform. The CFU has been a prominent
player in relation to the land issue in Zimbabwe, and has
consistently argued that rapid land reform would undermine white
confidence and threaten export earnings and employment. The
inclusion of at least 10 government ministers and over 500 black
members in 1989 (Palmer, 1990) no doubt bolstered their position.
The Union was largely responsible for ensuring that the position of
commercial farmers remained secure (at least up to the 1990's),
through courting government over a range of issues. Through having
the ear of the Ministry of Land and Agriculture (as well as
influence in the seven other ministries involved in resettlement)
the CFU was able to successfully slow the pace of resettlement.

(v)
by 1983 already there was increasing pressure on the domestic budget
of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government came under increasing
pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as western donor
governments, to undertake belt-tightening. The government complied
by cutting back on resettlement (but continues with funding to newly
established schools and clinics).

(vi)
in the mid-1980's there was severe drought in the sub-region, which
was particularly hard-hitting in Zimbabwe. As a result some new
settlers returned to communal areas in search of better conditions.
The government of Zimbabwe also used extensive resources on relief.

•People-driven
land reform

Although
characterised as state-centred and market-based, the 1980 to 1996
period did see people-driven acquisitions as well (what Moyo, 2001:24
refers to as a "community land occupation approach"). This
was especially so in the first four years, where peoples action was
closely linked to the government programme itself (in the form of the
'accelerated resettlement programme'). Under this approach,
communities drove land identification through occupation of abandoned
and under-utilised lands, with government following and purchasing
this land at market price. Most of the land acquired in this manner
was in the liberation war zone of the Eastern Highlands.

By
1986 however, the government had moved to end this practice.
Occupations were now deemed illegal and both police and farmers
evicted occupiers. Occupations (and land redistribution in general)
slowed dramatically after 1986. Occupations slowed during the period
which followed (although never disappeared entirely), until
re-emerging strongly again from around 1996.

•Issues
in relation to Market-Based Land Acquisition

The
experience of market-based land acquisition over the 1980's and
1990's throws up three key issues:

(i)
the amount, quality, location and cost of land are driven by
landholders (and their own interests);

(ii) neither the government nor
beneficiaries drive the process in terms of their needs; and

(iii) the state being the key buyer
of land distorts the land market through setting parameters in terms
of pricing and location (as determined by the government's broader
settlement planning framework).

As a
consequence, over 70 per cent of land acquired for resettlement
through the market has been agro-ecologically marginal and located
mainly in the drier, more climatically erratic, southern regions of
the country. The bulk of prime land in the three Mashonaland
provinces (covering the central highlands) has largely been
untouched. The land offered to the state has been geographically
scattered, and thus moving settlers from communal areas to isolated
farms in small groups was both expensive and logistically
inefficient.

•Conflict
with donors

As
noted earlier, the conditionalities imposed by Lancaster, have been a
central issue of contention in Zimbabwe, and has been especially
significant in shaping the relationship between the government of
Zimbabwe and the UK. This section explores this issue in more detail.

The
1980's

Conflict
between the Government of Zimbabwe and the UK is rooted in the
conditionalities imposed by the UK (and later other multi-lateral
agencies) on financial support to the land reform programme. In
terms of the programme in Zimbabwe, the UK laid down strict
conditions, including detailed planning and surve

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