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Three decades of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe

Sam Moyo

This article examines the empirical facts about the actual outcome of Zimbabwe’s land reform, based on years of field research. It shows that the popular assumption about failed land reform in Zimbabwe is wrong on several counts: the character of Zimbabwe’s land reform has been redistributive, and the extent of this has been wide enough to trigger significant progressive changes in the agrarian structure. This is despite some elites having benefited from the process and foreign-owned agro-industrial estates and conservancies being retained. The distribution of land among land reform beneficiaries has been relatively uneven, with some receiving larger land allocations than others, and this in turn influenced the differentiated access of these groups to farming services and infrastructure. Yet the productivity of small producers has grown slowly with output escalating recently. Three decades of land reform has recast land-based social relations in important ways, with the poor gaining more than previously believed.

Keywords: market-based land reforms; agrarian transformation; social differentiation; small producers; pluri-form land tenure; farm labour tenancy

Introduction

Zimbabwe now has a 30-year experience of land reform since Independence in 1980. While the achievements and limits of redistribution of Zimbabwe’s earlier land reform, from 1980 until 1999, have been extensively documented (Kinsey 1983, 1999, Moyo 1995, 1999), few scholars have examined empirically the distributional character of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) implemented since 2000 (Moyo 2005, 2009, Chambati 2009, Mandizadza 2009, Moyo et al. 2009, Matondi 2010, Murisa 2010, Scoones et al. 2010); hence, missing in most analyses is the cumulative impact of land reform on existing agrarian structure. Even fewer have contemplated the possibility that the structural reforms initiated by the FTLRP could be historically progressive, with potentially positive effects on society and agrarian relations – despite its recognised democratic and distributional deficits (Bernstein 2005, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Mamdani 2008). Instead the debate has focused on the immediate political motives of the FTLRP, selectively highlighting its aspects of ‘violence’, ‘disorder’, and ‘chaos’, claiming that the ruling Zanu PF elite and the state instrumentalised the FTLRP for electoral support and...
that only Zanu PF cronies benefited. By neglecting to examine the character and scale of redistribution of the FTLRP, and not looking at it from a longer historical perspective, the literature on Zimbabwe’s agrarian reform is deprived of a crucial viewpoint.

It is casually assumed that Zimbabwe’s agriculture was destroyed, and the cause of the collapse was the fast track land reform. Some critics of recent land reforms in Zimbabwe have argued that ‘crony capitalism’ has destroyed agriculture, and created a ‘humanitarian (food) crisis’ (Campbell 2008, Bond 2008). All of Zimbabwe’s economic and farming woes are ascribed to the displacement of white farmers and related ‘misgovernance’, while the effects of diverse internal and external factors operating over time, before and during the fast track land reform, are ignored. The phenomenon of reduced agricultural production is treated as linear based on the presumed value of replicating the output mix of former large farmers. This assumption is without empirical basis, and detaches the analysis of land reform from the broader question of agrarian transformation, leading to flawed conclusions about the relationship between land ownership, land reform, and agricultural development.

Agrarian reform entails transforming the role of various agrarian classes in struggles for development and democratization, towards equitable land ownership and social relations of production, and developing the agricultural production forces to enhance food security, livelihoods and the accumulation of capital (Byres 1991, 1996, Bernstein 2010). The basic purpose is to ‘create the conditions for a rise in [agricultural] productivity, such that [the] raw materials and wage-goods needs of a growing manufacturing sector can be met, while labour is released’ (Patnaik 2003, 8). Land reform, as a key dimension of agrarian reform, is a necessary but insufficient condition for national development (Moyo and Yeros 2005), yet it is critical to agricultural and social transformation (Chang 2009). Agrarian reform requires state-facilitated land redistribution, building the productive and social capabilities of small producers, and support for agro-industrial growth and diversification (Evans 2009).

Re-orienting agricultural production to the home market and broadening the consumption of wage and industrial goods and services is essential to increasing intersectoral linkages and agricultural productivity growth, in synergy with rising domestic wages. For small and middle-sized farms to realize their employment potential there has to be a synergy between state interventions in industrial, trade and rural development policies, so as to enhance the potential multiplier effects of agriculture and increase aggregate demand. Accumulation from below is a key objective of redistributive land and agrarian reform. Politically, land reform implies restructuring the distribution of land ownership towards a more democratic agrarian structure in order to promote social, economic and political transformation, which creates security of land tenure for all (ANC Conference 2007). In former settler-colonial Africa, which suffered long-term racial minority rule, particular grievances over land alienation, and institutionalised race-class and ethno-regional inequalities, the politics of redistributive land and agrarian reform entail historically specific socio-political demands that have to be satisfied.

However, agrarian elites tend to be an economically powerful and politically reactionary landed class. They monopolise land and force the population into the

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1See Hammar et al. (2003), Hellum and Derman (2004), Raftopolous (2009), Scarnecchia et al. (2008), Karumbidza (2004).
role of landless labourers, and in turn reduce incentives among landowners and workers to invest (Evans 2009). For land reform to be redistributive it need not transfer all the landowners’ land to the non-landed poor, but a substantive enough amount to alter social and agrarian relations (see Borras 2005, 2006). But the diminished influence of agrarian elites after land reforms (as in China, Korea and Taiwan), relieves the conservative pressures on developmental policy formation, allowing opportunities for broad-based economic growth. It is widely claimed however that the prospects for redistributive land reform under neo-liberalism are slim due to institutional and political constraints (Borras 2005).

Understanding Zimbabwe’s land reform in this broader context is therefore important. Was redistribution possible, and what were the outcomes and implications for longer term agrarian change? This article examines the nature of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution outcomes and the pattern of agrarian change that has emerged. It first assesses the scale and social differentiation of access to land, including the resultant exclusions, as well as the reformation of land tenure relations and its social implications. Then it explores the trajectory of agrarian change, in terms of the focus and structure of agricultural production and emerging relations of production and distribution, and their implications for accumulation and social reproduction within the recent political and economic context.

Numerous local sub-district field surveys undertaken between 2002 and 2004 and a national baseline survey organised by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) between 2005 and 2006 (AIAS Baseline Survey 2009), followed by various field visits during 2007 and 2009, provide the basic data for this study. These are backed by multiple local and national sources of secondary data collected since 2000. The six baseline survey districts studied are of varied agro-ecological potential with generally diverse but mixed farming systems, ethno-regional and local political contexts. Questionnaire surveys, key informant checklists and interviews, focus group discussions, field observations, and other opportunistic open interviews were used. The household interviews were conducted in both the A1 and A2 settlement schemes of the FTLRP, covering 2,089 households, with 79 percent of these being A1 settlers; the interviews covered a diverse range of socio-economic, agricultural and land issues. Up to 761 farm workers were interviewed – 414 former farm workers (or 54.4 percent of the total) and 347 new farm workers – about their socio-economic, labour and organisational situation. The focus group discussions examined critical issues faced by various segments of the sample area population.

The present article focuses on the macro picture of the land and agrarian reforms, however a separate paper looking into the wider details uncovered in the district level field surveys is being considered for publication.

**Land redistribution over three decades**

During the last three decades, Zimbabwe implemented land reform in three phases. The first phase, lasting through 1985, consisted of market sales of land led by state land acquisition and redistribution. It also entailed intensive illegal land occupations. Substantial land transfer occurred, albeit below the official targets. The second phase, from 1986 until 1999, through the era of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), enabled the state to acquire some land through expropriation and market mechanisms. The third, FTLRP phase, which began in 2000 and entailed intensive land expropriation alongside ‘illegal land occupations’, has continued until...
2010. By 2009, 6,214 farmland properties covering above 10 million hectares were being acquired, but not all were allocated, and 168,671 families gained land (see Table 1). The original FTLRP target of expropriating five million hectares has been overtaken. By 2009, less than 400 individually owned white farms remained. Interestingly, the large agro-industrial plantations or estates and conservancies were not substantively expropriated, although they lost some land and/or were partially ‘illegally’ occupied. There was initially some prevarication over the expropriation of foreign-owned farms covered by Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (BIPPAs), but over 77 percent of them were eventually redistributed by 2009.

Across these three land reform phases, a wide range of blacks, especially the non-landed, which includes poor land-short farmers, the landless, agricultural workers, poor urban workers and the unemployed, sought land reform to redress racial and class inequalities, foreign domination and historical loss. Some of the better-off black middle class, entrepreneurs and political elites also gained land, sometimes claiming to be ‘landless’, due to past racial- and class-based segregation and exclusions.

Stepping back, we should recall that land reform was, for some, intended to ‘de-racialise’ commercial farming (Nkomo 2001). More critically, redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe was conceived to relieve landlessness and ‘overcrowding’. Redistributive land reforms would, it was argued, breakdown the territorial and social segregation of Communal Areas from former large-scale commercial farming areas in terms of local administration and land tenure regulation, and enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and livestock between them. This would redefine territoriality, including local and national sovereignty over the areas formerly under the so-called LSCF (Large-Scale Commercial Farms) ‘domestic government’

Table 1. ‘Fast track’ farm expropriations and allocations (2000–9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Ha</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>662,330</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12,309</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14,278</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash Central</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>906,761</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>16,853</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2,978</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19,831</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash East</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1,254,661</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>17,731</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22,131</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1,730,042</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>28,435</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>8,333</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>36,768</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1,961,805</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>33,197</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>34,545</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat North</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1,828,123</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>9,394</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10,273</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1,457,703</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10,812</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12,347</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1,015,461</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>17,044</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18,438</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>10,816,886</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>145,775</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22,896</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>168,671</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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3 This is called ‘de-congestion’ in Zimbabwe’s land reform policy. Definition of the concept and the targets required to achieve it are vague.
Enclaves of political rule and private economic domination would cease to exist, and the erstwhile unequal rural political power relations would be altered.

Redistributive agrarian reform would also alter the wider social relations of production and reproduction. It would free peasant part-time labour and farm compound labour from the economic compulsion to provide cheap labour to the LSCF farms, mines and industry, and ensure that the land residency and land use rights of farm labour are detached from the provision of labour, effectively abolishing the exploitative ‘farm compound labour tenancy’, alongside progressive labour laws, which improve working conditions.

Where the design of agrarian reform strategy is bimodal, as is the case with the A1 (promoting small-scale family farms) and A2 (promoting medium- and large-scale capitalist farms) schemes in Zimbabwe, which a priori provides for uneven access, the implementation of secondary redistributive mechanisms on the larger farms and estates would be a prerequisite. These would include progressive taxation of land, lease fees, infrastructure use charges and tax on profits and dividends, intended to achieve equitable redistribution through income transfers. The share-equity transfer scheme targeting large agro-industrial estates and conservancies would have to be proportionately distributed among a broad base of black beneficiaries (in class, gender and ethno-regional terms), including neighbouring communities. In turn, state support in terms of subsidised inputs and credit to the A1 and A2 beneficiaries and estates would have to be proportional and equitable.

Were these ideals realised in practice? What social, political and economic processes constrained such an agrarian transition in the Zimbabwean case? The following sections explore these questions.

How redistributive was Zimbabwe’s land reform?

Between 1980 and 2009, over 13 of the 15 million hectares of land, which in 1980 were controlled mostly by 6,000 white farmers, had been transferred to over 240,000 families of largely rural origin, but in a relatively differentiated manner (Table 2). The scale of state farming land decreased to about 115,601 hectares while the private transfers to a few black capitalist farmers with LSCF amounted to 530,632 hectares. The FTLRP phase of the land reform officially benefited 168,671 families, comprising mainly the rural poor and their urban counterparts across 9.2 million hectares. These families acquired an average 20 hectares of land, and hold 70 percent of the transferred land, through the A1 schemes. By 2010 over 22,000 new small, medium, and large-scale capitalists also benefited with relatively larger plots averaging about 100 hectares under the A2 scheme. This scheme had benefited, about 16,000 families in 2008. There were wide variations in the relative numbers of land beneficiaries and plot sizes across the various provinces and agro-ecological regions (Sukume and Moyo 2003, Moyo et al. 2009).

According to the AIAS Baseline Survey across six districts (Moyo et al. 2009), over 82 percent of the beneficiaries had been formally allocated land by government. A few beneficiaries (2.9 percent) claimed to have purchased their plots. About 15 percent had gained access to land through illegal ‘land occupations’, some of which

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4Between 2009 and 2010 more unallocated and newly expropriated land was allocated to A1 and A2 beneficiaries.
Table 2. Overall land redistribution between 1980 and 2010: acquisition and allocation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Acquired LSCF farms</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. of farmland</td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>1980–1997</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>3,498,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception phase</td>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>168,264</td>
<td>168,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast track</td>
<td>1999–2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>2,564&lt;sup&gt;1,2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,759,153&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>2,295&lt;sup&gt;1,2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,509,437&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unallocated gazetted land</strong></td>
<td>517</td>
<td>757,578</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,376</td>
<td>10,026,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private transfers</td>
<td>1980–2009</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>676,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ungazetted total</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>912,147</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,281,348</td>
<td>245,437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (2009), Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement 2010 data. (1) includes some farms with multiple properties that have been counted as one; (2) GoZ data shows that there were 6,214 gazetted farms, of which over 501 farms (white, indigenous, churches, etc.), despite being gazetted, were recommended to stay (MLRR 2009).
were not formalised, while the others had the allocation subsequently formalised by government. The rest were officially allocated land by government, although only some have received offer letters.

Beyond the official figures, many more families, including relatives of the official beneficiaries, ‘informally’ gained access to sub-plots of land allocated to them by the beneficiaries (Moyo et al. 2009). Up to 27 percent of the official beneficiaries admitted to having ‘shared’ their land with relatives, friends and neighbours, or rented land (Moyo et al. 2009, 34). Contrary to the common assumptions about the newly redistributed lands, the survey revealed that substantial numbers of people other than the official land beneficiaries are settled on the land, including through informal land sharing and rental arrangements. In the survey districts 35 percent of the resident populations were former and new farm workers living in both A1 and A2 areas, but not recognised as land beneficiaries (Table 3).

As a result of land redistribution, about 13 percent of Zimbabwe’s entire agricultural land is now held by a range of middle–scale farmers (on A2, LSCF and small–scale commercial farms [SSCF]), while over 70 percent is held by small farm producers (in the Communal Areas, in A1 areas and in informal settlements), and only 11 percent is held by large farms and estates. This stands in stark contrast to the pre-1980 and pre-1999 situations when agricultural lands were predominantly held by the LSCF farms and large estates. There has been a ‘net transfer of wealth and power’ from a racial minority of landed persons to mostly landless and land-poor classes and a substantial number of low–income–earning workers.

Nevertheless, about 1.7 million hectares had not yet been acquired by 2009. These unacquired lands represent a combination of export–focused agro-industrial plantations and conservancies and mining farmlands owned by transnational corporations. Furthermore, during the 1990s the state had sanctioned the ownership of agricultural lands by ‘blacks’ through non-profit public trusts, including churches and educational institutions. The most notable one was the Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ), which owns 386,000 hectares held through freehold title deeds. In addition, out of the 6,214 farmland properties held by over 4,000 white farmers that were acquired by 2009, there were still about 757,600 hectares (representing 517 gazetted farmland properties) which had not yet been allocated to beneficiaries. Seven of the unacquired farms were conservancies covering over 752,005 hectares, or 44 percent of the unallocated land in 2009. However, the bulk (over 70 percent) of this land has since been redistributed mostly to A1 and A2 beneficiaries as of 2010. These conservancies are being ‘indigenised’, through the creation of ‘equity-sharing holding’ schemes, involving the former white land owners and black ‘investors’, and to a lesser degree in practise local ‘community trusts’. The rest of the ‘unallocated land’ represents private large farm lands still being operated by the former owners (blacks and whites). Some of this land represents farms that are facing litigation from remaining white farmers, while others include white farmers who are being accommodated.

Over 18 percent of Zimbabwe’s 39 million hectares of land (including parks and forests) is now state land. There was a decrease in agricultural land area owned by the state farming agency (ARDA) from 122,751 hectares to 115,601 hectares, despite

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5The DTZ was formed by Joshua Nkomo the leader of the former PF Zapu, putatively as a public trust on behalf of the former ZIPRA guerilla. It was then broadened into a trust governed by leaders of the merged Zanu PF.
Table 3. Key demographic features of populations resident on redistributed farms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People in NRAs*</th>
<th>Chipinge</th>
<th>Chiredzi</th>
<th>Goromonzi</th>
<th>Kwekwe</th>
<th>Mangwe</th>
<th>Zvimba</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of farms</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households settled on farm</td>
<td>4950</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>2952</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatters</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm workers</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired farm workers</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7454</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2902</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5920</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: * NRA is newly resettled areas.
the increase in the farms from 20 to 24 in 1999 and 2010, respectively. The FTLRP chose not to redistribute these lands but to expand them, even though there are popular demands for such land. More recently, some joint ventures with foreign and local white capital have been established on ‘resurrected’ state agricultural lands, including about 50,000 hectares in the ARDA Middle-Sabi Estates, largely to produce sugar for domestic ethanol (agrofuel) production and exports. Meanwhile, the GoZ (MLRR 2009) reports that there are over 100,000 people on its waiting lists for land, indicating that there is still very high demand for land despite the redistribution, especially when we add the demands for residential land in urban and rural areas.

The land reform was not free of corruption, as some evidence points to a few elites within the state farming apparatus and others connected to them monopolising the benefits from state estates, including the grazing of livestock on unutilised state farms. Some A2 land beneficiaries are reported to be corruptly using some of the acquired but unallocated lands for opportunistic or temporary enterprises (e.g. grazing), fuelling the delay of the redistribution of such lands. Some individual elites gained access to multiple farms and/or plots larger than the sizes recommended for redistribution, while a few ‘grabbed’ legally some of the moveable properties of the former farmers. Yet, it is wrong to claim that such corrupt practice is the dominant trend, as suggested by other observers (see also Scoones et al. 2010).

In addition to the redistribution of land, a range of on-farm infrastructures, called ‘improvements’ or ‘immovables’ such as farm houses, barns, bore holes, workshops, sheds, and irrigation piping, and off-farm infrastructures (dams, roads, electricity lines, etc.), that were left on the farms provide additional assets to the beneficiaries. One third of the A2 plots gained some of these infrastructures on an individual basis, with the rest getting under-developed parts of farms or ‘plain’ land. In A1 areas most of this infrastructure is shared among the beneficiaries, including it being used as social amenities and as other public service facilities. There were also some ‘movables’ (machinery, generators, pumps, etc.) which were left by some former farmers. These inherited ‘improvements’ are, however, the focus of controversial contests over compensation by former landowners.

Many beneficiaries say land reform helped achieve what the liberation war was meant to bring (Sadomba 2008). The scope of sovereignty and self-determination in such areas is considered to have been enlarged for some, who refer to the reforms in terms of regaining territorial autonomy. Accompanying the transfer of land as an object is also the transmission of a range of intrinsic social values, such as the symbolic and spiritual value attached to land in Zimbabwe, which the colonial land grab had undermined. Many claim that the land redistribution restored their identity (e.g. in relation to ancestral graves, etc.) and re-establishes their ‘belonging’ within the given territories. Some women claim that land reform liberated them from the customary tenure rules typical of Communal Areas and that they are optimistic about their land rights struggles vis-à-vis the state (WFLA 2009). Land redistribution also brought along increased access to and better distribution of the benefits from natural resources such as water, indigenous forests and wildlife, as well as other social benefits realised from such resources. Some individuals gained more direct access to these resources than others. The proliferation of small-scale mining (especially gold panning and mining) reflects, according to some interviewees in Kwekwe, a ‘liberation of mineral resources, which had been hidden under the monopolistic LSCF farms’ (interview, 2006). Unfortunately the state has vigorously
tried to evict gold panners, while group land disputes found in the newly resettled areas reflect the competing interests of the new miners and new farmers. Nonetheless, increased access to these varied resources indicates that much more has been gained than the focus on the redistributed land reveals.

In sum, contrary to the popular assumption that only cronies of the ruling party benefited from land redistribution, empirical data demonstrate that ordinary poor people benefited from land redistribution — to an extent that is far greater than previously estimated. Seventy percent of these beneficiaries are in A1 farms — or the small-scale family farm units.

**Race, gender, ethnicity and nationality**

The post-2000 land reform has resulted in a range of exclusions and inclusions, resulting in a highly differentiated pattern. This section explores the dynamics according to some key axes of difference: race, gender, ethnicity and nationality.

The relatively limited allocation of land to former white landholders is frequently raised to question the fairness of the redistributive outcome of the land reform on grounds of racial discrimination against some white citizens. Some former white farmers argue that they benefited less than they should have because of their colour or a failure by the state to recognise their ‘indigeneity’ to Zimbabwe. Some so-called ‘coloureds’ argue the same.

Interestingly, the fact that until 2007 there were about 725 remaining white farmers holding over one million hectares throughout the eight provinces (GoZ, MLRR statistics) has been missed by most critics. Many of the white farmers held relatively large landholdings in the drier southern provinces (Midlands, Matabeleland and Masvingo), as well as one high rainfall province (Mashonaland East). At the time, more than 12 percent of the remaining farms were over 2,000 hectares in size, amounting to a total of 1,044,723 hectares, while only 295 of the farms held were fewer than 500 hectares. At that point white farmers comprised about four percent of the new large ‘commercial’ farming sector (comprising A2 landholders, agro-industrial estates and conservancies). Following the flurry of former LSCF farmer litigations at the SADC tribunal in 2007 in a context of election campaigns in 2008, many of these farms, including those of the litigants, were expropriated.

Since demographically the white population, which is less than 75,000, is well below half a percent of the total population, if former white farmers constitute at least one percent of A2 farmers, or about 100 of the remaining LSCF farmers (excluding the mainly foreign white-owned large agro-industrial corporations), then their representation would be proportionate. Indeed there are 400 white farmers still on the farms. Whereas more of them could have been selected to remain on the basis of their skills and experience, it can hardly be argued that their representation is racially inequitable. In fact the FTLRP has led to a ‘de-racialisation’ of the LSCF sector since the addition of thousands more A2 black commercial farmers. Nonetheless, many agree that more of the truly productive former white LSCF landowners could have been allowed access to smaller plots of land based on the principle of right based on the ‘one person one farm, within the maximum farm size range’ policy, rather than as a matter of historical course derived from racial privilege.

There are also claims that the FTLRP excluded some people on ethnic grounds within provinces, especially in the A2 schemes. Although the data remain weak on
the ethno-regional dimension of access to land, available evidence suggests varying degrees of either under-representation or over-representation of some ethnic groups in land access in some provinces. One alleged case of over-presentation relates to people from ‘Mashonaland’ within the Matabeleland provinces’ conservancies and peri-urban farms. There were a few high profile cases of individual A2 farmers evicted in a number of provinces on ethno-regional grounds. At the local level it is sometimes argued that certain clans and lineage family groups, or extended families, gained more access to land than others did. The mobilisation of land occupations was not even among the provinces, such that some groups would have gained more than others. In Matabeleland South for instance, land occupiers from the Midlands province were more actively engaged and they occupied large swathes of the Debshan farms owned by the Oppenheimer family, to the chagrin of the landless peoples around Shangani and Fort Rixon (interviews in 2004). War veterans from Matabeleland blamed this on the ‘passivity’ of the Matabeleland provinces during the land occupations, which they attributed to their alleged allegiance to the opposition party MDC.

Mashonaland West was reportedly a notable ethno-regional ‘hotspot’ by 2004. A radical war veterans group in an association called Mwati alleged that some of the provincial Zanu PF leaders at the time were targeting over 50 A2 beneficiaries for eviction, including senior Zanu PF and state security leaders, putatively because they did not originate from that province. In the process about 20 farms there were being ‘hoarded’ to avoid their going into the wrong hands (AIAS Dialogue 2004). One of the chiefs in Mazowe district was until 2008 involved in recurrent confrontations with the provincial lands officials over their demarcation of a sizeable amount of land for A2 farms. He protested that too much land was allocated to ‘outsiders’ at the expense of locals in both the A2 and A1 schemes. It is also common to hear people say that when they had applied for A2 land and presented their National Identity Card (the serial numbers of which indicate province of birth), if they came from the wrong provinces they did not get land.

The application process became ethno-regionally structured. Some elites, during the 2000 to 2002 period, sought land near the more ethnically cosmopolitan towns where they live (particularly Harare and Bulawayo), while others sought land near their Communal Area ‘home’ (kumusha) districts. Eventually most applicants resorted to bidding for land where they ‘belong’, as conflicts increasingly arose between A2 beneficiaries who ‘belong’ to given districts and those who are deemed not to. Indeed some local elites advocated for the exclusion of ‘strangers’ and, during the height of land bidding (2000–03), there were many ‘evictions’ or unfair rejections of applicants on ethno-regional grounds. Consequently, access to land, particularly in the A2 scheme, tended to be partly shaped by ethno-regional affinities throughout all the provinces, although the policy was that the A2 scheme was ‘national’. This reflects a simmering ethnicised intra-class competition for land, replicating incipient tendencies in the 1990s (Moyo 1995, 1999).

Ethno-regional and national identities tend however to be dynamic or malleable social constructs, having been shaped by colonial displacements and regional administrative fiat, and subsequent provincial political mobilisation. It can be expected that future land struggles may evolve around the reconstruction of ethno-regional identities, as land hunger increases again due to demographic growth and if unemployment persists especially where there are large landholdings.
The FTLRP increased women’s access to land ownership. This occurred because women’s advocacy groups (such as the Women’s Land Lobby Group) were among the few NGOs who openly supported the land reform by demanding access to the expropriated land. This relatively redistributive gender outcome has endured despite the open and clandestine resistance it faces from some dominant patriarchs within the state apparatus, among some customary leaders, and within some lineage household leaderships.

A larger proportion of women, between 12 and 18 percent, now own land in their own right (Buka 2002, Utete 2003, GoZ 2007), compared to the four percent of white women who owned LSCF lands (Rugube et al. 2003, Moyo 1998) and the five percent of black women who controlled the land in previous resettlement areas and communal lands (see Figure 1). Other studies suggest that women ‘beneficiaries in their own right’ range between 10 percent and 28 percent of the total (Chingarande 2008, WLZ 2007). Women mostly benefited from access to land as spouses, implying a subordinate level of control over such land. Research is yet to quantify the quality of such access in newly redistributed areas under the prevailing patriarchal system (see Jirira and Halimana 2008).

Gendered land access inequities mostly originated at the point when women who were applying for land faced bureaucratic bottlenecks in a male dominated beneficiary selection process, and because women lacked adequate information on selection procedures (Midzi and Jowa 2007). Nonetheless, the increased access to land by women in both A1 and A2 areas suggests a new dynamic in the gender relations in land access and use. Indeed, more women have been offered land in their individual right under the fast track programme than in the past. Such woman landholders do not seem to predominantly come from the ‘vulnerable’ groups, such as widows and divorcees, as obtains in communal and older resettlement areas.

The FTLRP also slightly altered the pattern of foreign land ownership in Zimbabwe. Before the FTLRP there was widely differentiated foreign ownership in terms of size, with 267 farms owned by persons from 13 countries, the bulk (65 percent) of which were from nine European nations, along with a few Americans (two percent). In area terms, the Germans, Dutch, Swiss and Italians collectively held 70 percent of the total foreign-owned farms. Three countries from the South (South Africa, Mauritius, and Indonesia) held 33 percent of the farms in number and

![Figure 1. Gender composition of land beneficiaries by model type. Source: AIAS Baseline Survey (2007).](image-url)
27 percent in area. About 20 percent of the foreign-owned farms ranged in size from 2,000 to over 50,000 hectares, although 70 of the farms (25 percent) were below 300 hectares in size. Foreign ownership predominated in the remaining LSCF plantation sub-sector when the agro-industrial estates were included. These foreign land holdings were relatively large in scale compared to the wider land grabbing that is underway in Africa.

After the FTLRP only 23 percent of the foreign BIPPA protected farms had not been settled by illegal land occupiers or official beneficiaries, while most of the agro-industrial estates were spared. There is also a new wave of large-scale foreign investments in agriculture, mainly on the remaining private estates, the DTZ and state estates. Debates on the persistence of extremely large and under-utilised foreign-owned estates with regard to how this contradicts the policy objective of redistributive land reform, and the moral hazards of maintaining them when local grievances over this inequity are high, are surprisingly muted (see Moyo forthcoming-a).

**Land access and political party affiliation**

Navigating the political dynamics associated with land occupations and allocation processes was crucial. But there were different dimensions of connectivity to leaders and officials in charge, including party affiliation, but professional, class, familial and other social networks, including church membership, were also important (see also Scoones et al. 2010). Access to A2 land allocations was more affected by this associational brokering, while participation in land occupations and negotiations with local leadership structures was key for A1 allocations. While the leadership of the opposition party (the MDC) distanced themselves from the land reform process, many people who were not necessarily Zanu PF voters were involved in the land allocation process. Among the A1 beneficiaries many belonged to provinces and areas that voted against Zanu PF in 2005 and 2008. Moreover, the membership of political parties has been malleable over the last decade, and it is a highly elusive variable to measure given the sensitivities and multiple tactical allegiances.

There is a belief that the liberation war veterans who led the land occupations gained a substantial amount of the transferred land. To the contrary, many war veterans did not get land, and those who did comprised less than eight percent of the land beneficiaries (Mutingwende 2004, Sadomba 2008, Moyo et al. 2009; also see Scoones et al. 2010). Moreover some members of the ZLWVA who did get land complain that they were being dispossessed of the land that they had occupied, largely because they were opposed to some elites getting larger plots (Sadomba 2008).

**Roots of class differentiation after land redistribution**

Social differentiation in access to land also had a class dimension, such that the outcome has the potential to reconfigure class formation processes. The main process of change has been the expansion in number and area of small cultivators and the expansion of the new ‘middle farmer’, at the expense of the few formerly

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5The middle farmer includes the colonially created small-scale commercial farm (SSCF) and post-1980 land beneficiaries, who comprise a social category of farmers holding
large-scale individual family farms. Most of the LSCF were multiple farm owners with average landholdings above 1,000 hectares, which were highly mechanised, used agro-chemicals and fertilizers, and hired labour extensively. Although still relatively small in number a new breed of black agrarian capitalist large-scale farm has also gradually emerged. The differential status and origins of those who gained access to varied land sizes and assets within the newly redistributed agricultural land suggests the emergence of a new agrarian structure.

A class-based differentiation process in the creation of black capitalist farmers arose firstly from the original policy design which created the A2 schemes (since 1998), which was later elaborated into three categories of beneficiaries: the small-, medium- and large-scale new commercial farms. In the perspective of land reform policymakers and A2 beneficiaries mainly of upper middle class origin (‘richer peasants’, chiefs, professionals and other capitalists) a racial balancing of capitalist agrarian accumulation is also, arguably, of redistributive value, since the intention was broad-based empowerment.

The dilemma facing the policy elites by 2002 was that over 50,000 people had applied for A2 plots, far more than the 8,000 who had been offered land (Utete 2003). Many aspiring ‘new farmers’ felt excluded, with some arguing that this was because they lacked connections to government or ruling party officials, chiefs, war veterans and others and/or the resources to effectively bid for land. By 2010 however, over 20,000 had been allocated A2 plots in a variety of sizes. Some A2 beneficiaries hold ‘multiple’ and ‘over-sized’ farms. The land area covered by multiple holdings still represents a relatively small proportion of the entire agricultural lands, although there are ways in which multiple holdings have been concealed. Nonetheless any degree of the incidence of multiple land holding is non-compliant with policy and diminishes the redistributive character of the land reform. These people essentially used ‘illegal’ or corrupt means to secure multiple farms within the newly redistributed areas, including using ‘pseudo-legal’ loopholes, such as the alleged poor quality of the land allocated to them.

Most beneficiaries came from rural areas, largely from Communal Areas, with some from the farm worker populations in LSCF areas. Nationally, the urban beneficiaries of the FTLRP range from 20 to 30 percent (Moyo et al. 2009). In some peri-urban areas (such as Goromonzi) the proportion of urban beneficiaries was on the higher end, reflecting the pressure mounted by lower income working peoples from Harare organised alongside the demands of the middle to upper class blacks for such areas (Marongwe 2009). Fewer than 25 percent of beneficiaries continue to retain their formal employment, with most of these having originated from urban areas. By far the largest numbers of land beneficiaries (70 percent) were unemployed people mainly from rural areas.

These findings confirm the shift towards increased demand for land that occurred in the context of declining formal employment and wages under structural adjustment in the 1990s, as well as an urban response to the deepening economic crises that evolved during the 2000s. Interestingly, the largest proportion of this
group is made up of unskilled working people, and includes lower ranking security personnel (Moyo et al. 2009). Moreover, those from the towns or cities were found to come equally from the public and private sector. This evidence questions the common tendency to assume that most beneficiaries were urban-based elites employed by government. Some A2 farmers have argued that their farm sizes need to be increased to assure ‘viability’. There are cases of eviction whereby connections were used to remove some of the politically weak beneficiaries. But such moves have also been successfully resisted. Some have used their new organisational networks to resist evictions (see Murisa 2010), reflecting real organised inter-class land struggles.

A number of black large-scale or A2 farmers have hired white farm managers who were either former landowners or farm managers, and they are paid salaries and/or shares of the farm produce. This occurs especially in high value enterprises (e.g. tobacco, dairy, export beef, horticulture, bananas, etc.) that require large financial commitments, specialised imported inputs and established export markets. There is also the suggestion that there are a number of former white farmers who are in control of A2 farms through a subletting system in which black owners are ‘fronts’, although this is difficult to verify. More commonly, former white farmers have moved up or downstream in the commercial farming value chain by acting as contract financiers and marketers (even supervisors of the farming operations of the new farmers), and as such have retained financial interest and influence in areas such as poultry, tobacco, export beef and horticulture.

Overall, therefore, there has been a broadening of the black rural ‘middle class’ through the creation of new capitalist farmers. This is suggested by some proponents of land reform to be a historical necessity for national development (see Nkomo 2001, Moyo and Yeros 2005). Some would claim that this indigenisation process qualifies the FTLRP reforms to be included in the genre of redistributive land reforms, given the settler-colonial legacy of race and class inequalities in the development of capitalist farming (see Moyo and Yeros 2005). Once constituted into an agrarian capitalist class, some of the middle farmers and large-scale black farmers forge alliances with white farmers, agro-industry and financial institutions, and frequently demand the re-introduction of private property in the agricultural lands within a neoliberal economic and agricultural policy framework.

Agricultural workers: exclusions based on migrancy and nationality

A critical aspect of exclusion relates to the various disadvantages that the former workers on LSCF farms have faced. Nonetheless about 10 percent of the land beneficiaries were former farm workers who were allocated A1 or A2 plots, some as farm workers, a few as ‘land occupiers’ (Sadomba 2008, Moyo et al. 2009), and others as members of communal area structures rather than as farm workers (Chambati 2009). Close to 70,000 out of the 350,000 former farm workers remain as labourers in the unacquired commercial farms and agro-industrial estates, while about 100,000 of them, who were mainly part-time workers, returned to the Communal Areas (Magaramombe 2003, Sachikonye 2003, Moyo and Chambati 2004). About 100,000 former farm workers, 30 percent of whom are alleged to be of ‘foreign migrant origin’, remain as residents on insecure labour tenancies within the redistributed lands, in A2 and A1 areas.

While many former farm workers are indeed Zimbabwean they tended to live in socially segregated farm compounds under the landowners in pseudo-feudal
patronage relationships (see also Rutherford 2003). Thus, the newly redistributed
lands, together with unacquired lands, accommodate a large proportion of the
former farm workers, albeit under fairly insecure conditions. On A2 farms, this
represents a form of labour-tenancy relationship, since some of the A2 farmers only
allow landless people, former farm workers and other potential workers to live in
their compounds if they provide them cheap labour.

Around 45,000 former farm workers are known to have been physically displaced
and living as ‘squatters’ (Moyo and Chambati 2004, Chambati and Magaramombe
2008). Many former farm workers who remain are informally allocated small
‘sistence plots’ of about one acre per family, especially in A1 areas. This
represents on the one hand a relative exclusion in an intra-working class contest
(between landless or land-short peasants and agricultural workers) which the farm
workers lost on grounds of poor political connections. On the other hand it
represents an inter-class confrontation between new small- and medium-sized
capitalist farmers and farm workers over the control of labour supplies and wages.
The current process of intensive labour exploitation, based on the existing
manipulative labour recruitment system, is largely associated with the insecure
labour tenancy among farm workers allowed to live in the inherited or newly built
farm compounds, rather than provided with their own land, at least for housing.
This sustains past practises of labour ‘bonding’ and patronage, which enable ‘semi-
forced’ and ‘unfree’ labour conditions in a situation where the state provides limited
rural labour protection, apparently due to capacity limitations, and where the
agricultural labour unions seem to be off-compass. Some of those who did not get
land or return to communal areas still live within the redistributed farming areas and
provide casual and permanent labour to A2 and A1 farmers, while the large farms
and estates retained many. Some new farmers tended to treat farm workers as
thieves, given high levels of stock theft, or as foreigners (although below 30 percent
are descendents of immigrants), and/or as ‘reactionaries’ who had opposed land
reform. Thus, farm workers’ residential land rights and access to small food security
plots continue, as before 2000, to be informal and tied to their provision of specific
labour services to landowners.

Thus, the inter-class land redistribution via A1 and (small to medium) A2
schemes differs from the intra-class transfer of land ownership that happened
between one racial group and another (from white elites to black elites) which some
‘indigenisation’ proponents espoused. The upper end of the A2 scheme has, to some
degree, diluted the redistributive character of the FTLRP, even if its scale is
relatively small.

Land tenure security
The land tenure system is socially differentiated as the A2 beneficiaries are provided
long lease contracts while the A1 beneficiaries get vague permits. The former are
expected to pay lease rental fees and the latter get the land free of charge. The state
has however not yet collected lease fees from the A2 beneficiaries, despite the fact
that they gained access to larger plots of land and some of them gained more capital
intensity-enabling infrastructures. Indeed, some A2 beneficiaries resist this charge,
claiming that is not affordable and that they oppose the principle of ‘paying for
reposed land’. Failure to enforce this policy, which represents a secondary
instrument for wealth redistribution, is a source of inequity.
By 2006 up to 78.5 percent of the land beneficiaries confirmed having ‘land offer letters’, while the rest claimed to have already received GoZ lease documents and title deeds (Moyo et al. 2009, Mhishi 2007), despite the fact that formal lease documents had not yet been widely issued. It seems the attitude among about 20 percent of the interviewees was that the issuance of formal land tenure documents was a matter of course, suggesting that they had confidence in their new land rights within the current land tenure situation.

A small minority (13.9 percent), however, doubted the security of their current forms of land tenure, as they deemed their current tenure to be either too vague or tenuous because of the absence of formal land permits and 99-year leases. Furthermore, some (4.5 percent) defined their landholding right as an ‘occupation’, while another 1.8 percent considered it a license, and 0.5 percent considered themselves to be ‘caretakers’ of the land. These landholders did not yet have any formal land offer in the form of a letter or verbal allocation. Altogether about 17 percent of the official beneficiaries in the sample, distributed almost equally between the A1 and A2 beneficiaries, appear to be uncertain about their land tenure status. Furthermore, about 21 percent of the beneficiaries reported that they also encounter problems, such as uncertainty and failure to access financial resources, because they do not have adequate land tenure documents. The majority of those who cited failure to access finance because of the lack of land tenure documentation were A2 landholders (Moyo et al. 2009).

It has often been argued that land tenure security is lacking among the FTLRP beneficiaries, especially among A1 beneficiaries, because they can easily be or are being evicted from the land (Matondi 2010). Yet only 16 percent of the beneficiaries had ever been threatened with eviction one or more times, and threats were indeed slightly higher among A1 families compared to the A2 households. Eviction threats were most prevalent in peri-urban districts such as Goromonzi, where 31 percent of the households faced eviction. Although the proportion of beneficiaries evicted from their plots by the state is relatively low, about nine percent of the land beneficiaries said they kept Communal Area homes because they feared that they could be evicted at some point in the future (Moyo et al. 2009, 45, Scoones et al. 2010).

Conflicts over land, however, are significant. The nature of land conflicts cited ranged from disputes over boundaries and land rights, the extraction of natural resources and ‘inherited’ access to infrastructures (2.7 percent), to conflicts arising from the interventions related to the GoZ’s land reform re-planning programme. There was little difference in the types or sources of land conflicts which occurred in the A1 and A2 areas. Boundary disputes were in general the major source of land conflicts, while ownership was more contested in the peri-urban and higher potential agro-ecological districts of Goromonzi and Zvimba in comparison to the other districts. The beneficiaries cited neighbours, local authorities and former land owners as key sources of conflicts (Moyo et al. 2009).

7The official allocation of land to beneficiaries (especially for the A2 scheme) entailed indicating to the beneficiaries either on maps and/or on the ground the plots they were being allocated, and a written ‘offer letter’ indicating the same, including the land use conditions. In A1 areas most land offers were done by physically pointing out the land to beneficiaries, while some also received the ‘offer letter’. As a follow-up assessment of the land tenure right, a 99-year lease document has been given to some A2 landholders, while an A1 permit is still to be issued. Title deeds in Zimbabwean parlance are generally used to refer to a registered certificate of land ownership, mainly on a freehold basis.
Notwithstanding the formally declared absence of freehold lands in newly distributed areas, a degree of land sales, sub-plot letting and plot rentals or informal land markets has been brewing (Sukume and Moyo 2003) despite the restrictions imposed by the current A2 leasehold contract. Admittedly, few of the interviewed A2 farmers would openly declare that they were engaged in land rentals. Some of the A2 farmers declared themselves short of either arable or grazing land in relation to their current scale of production, claiming higher capacities to utilise rented land (Sukume and Moyo 2003, Moyo et al. 2009). Circumstantial field evidence suggests that at times such informal land rental arrangements were sanctioned by the local land authorities, especially where underutilised and/or unallocated lands were common. About 26 percent of the A1 land beneficiaries shared land, while only 15 percent of the A2 households did (Moyo et al. 2009). Land sharing was extremely high in Kwekwe District (90 percent), followed by Goromonzi District (27 percent), while in other districts, land sharing averaged less than 15 percent.

Two thirds of such land sharing was with relatives and friends, as well as with adult family relatives. The rest of the land was shared with former and current farm workers, squatters, and gold miners and millers. A few of the households even shared land with the former commercial farmers. Land sharing varied among the districts, with eight percent of the Kwekwe District beneficiaries reporting sharing land with former commercial farmers (Moyo et al. 2009). At that time the negotiated ‘co-existence’ between land beneficiaries and LSCF farmers was more common there. Furthermore, just over 20 percent of the Kwekwe District beneficiary households reported sharing land with gold miners and millers, reflecting the ‘gold rush’ experience there since the FTLRP.

New agrarian structure and changing agrarian relations

Land reform had by 2010 led to a major reconfiguration of Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure in terms of landholding sizes. Four classes of farmers – small producers, middle farmers, large farmers and estates – were retained but their numbers changed substantially. The numbers of peasants and small- to medium-scale farmers increased, and together they control over 80 percent of the land, leading to a significantly reduced number of large-scale farms and estates. The scale of state farm lands increased slightly.

A broadly based agrarian capitalist class, built on former and new farming ‘elites’, has also emerged. The smaller segment of large-scale capitalist farmers now includes both black and white farmers, but their landholdings have been substantially downsized to an average of 700 hectares, compared to the average of 2,000 hectares held by large-scale landowners in the past. Over 75 percent of the new middle capitalist farmers have plots of less than 100 hectares, but these also vary across agro-ecological regions.

In the pre-2000 agrarian structure, most of the unequal agrarian power relations were transmitted through control of land by the few landowners who influenced the social relationships of agricultural production, particularly through their hold on labour, compelled onto the farming labour market by necessity. Redistribution has in general reversed the labour subordinating effects that land dispossession had enabled. The unequal control over labour power, whereby land-short, landless and poor peasants had been forced into an insecure and exploitative system of cheap agrarian wage labour in farming and mining areas and elsewhere, has been altered.
Land redistribution has allowed a large section of rural peasant society to use their own family labour for their own social reproduction in newly gained farming lands. It has also created some level of choice among the peasantry and rural labourers with regard to selling their excess labour within a differentiated farming set-up and in local non-farm activities. Although many of the former LSCF farm workers, half of whom were part-time peasants (semi-proletarian), did not gain access to land, even they have become relatively freer to sell their labour to many new small- to medium-sized farmers, in addition to their access to small plots to cultivate ‘subsistence’ crops, albeit under poorly defined or ‘squatting’ tenures.

Clearly the land and labour rights of farm workers remain poor. About 68 percent of the farm workers indicated that their key land problem was their lack of access to secure land for residency and to exploit natural resources for their basic needs (Chambati 2009). The efforts to secure these often led to conflicts over the boundaries of land ‘owned’ by the official beneficiaries vis-à-vis the plots that workers were ‘permitted’ to reside on. Almost half of the farm workers faced problems with the new landholders who paid low wages and provided insecure living conditions. Around 13 percent of the farm workers had experienced violent confrontations with the new landholders as a result of these conflicts (Moyo et al. 2009, Chambati and Moyo 2009; see also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2007).

Notable is the fact that many of the new farms or land beneficiaries also employ farm workers, among both the small- (A1) and medium- to larger-scale new farmers (see Table 3). They are recruited from among former LSCF farm workers and other social categories, such as the locally unemployed and family members (see Chambati 2009 for details), thus constituting a new agrarian labour force.

Furthermore the use of hired and family labour is itself a critical factor in the social differentiation of the beneficiaries of the land reform. Disaggregated labour hiring patterns (Chambati and Moyo 2009) suggest that about 26 percent of land beneficiaries use hired labour intensively, while on average most households command family labour pools of 3.5 persons (see Table 5).

Land redistribution has also opened new avenues for rural labour as workers or self-employed operators in small mining (especially of gold), wildlife, exploitation, and fuel-wood and timber extraction. These activities have arisen as a result of the exposure of previously privately controlled natural resources to more people, and the loosening of private property protection security systems. The dynamics of competing access to these resources is one of the main sources of land conflicts, as is their related effect of reducing farm labour supplies.

A larger aspect of the new land politics relates to conflicts that emerge from the differentiated class formation process that is underway. The differential capacity of some of the A2 and A1 beneficiaries to hire labour, in addition to differential access to working capital from various sources, has triggered a social differentiation process that is expressed in the land tenure dynamics and conflicts identified above. This may also reinforce the process of elite bidding for the enlargement of A2 landholdings, with the more ‘successful’ beneficiaries justifying increased land rentals and/or corrupt usurpation of neighbours’ lands.

The number of small farm producers, who hold land ranging in size from one to 30 hectares, depending on natural region, and combining family arable landholdings, ranging from 0.2 to 5.0 hectares, and common grazing land, has expanded to over 1.3 million families (Table 4). These include households in ‘Communal’ lands, those
### Table 4. Emerging agrarian structure: estimated landholdings (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm categories</th>
<th>Farms/households (000's)</th>
<th>Area held (000 ha)</th>
<th>Average farm size (ha)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old resettlement</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old SSCF</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small A2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large A2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black LSCF</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White LSCF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-estates</td>
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<td>Corporate</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.049</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parastatal</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservancies</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>714.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,138.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Compiled by Author and Ndabezinhle Nyoni from Moyo and Yeros (2005), MLRR (2009), GoZ MLLR 2010 data.

**Notes:** Total hectarages do not tally due to rounding; some agricultural land is now residential (urban) and missing data on farm sizes allocated to various beneficiaries during the FTLRP.
resettled by 1999, and the newly resettled A1 households, including former full-time urban workers. In general, the new peasantry has smaller farm sizes than their A2 counterparts. Since the large majority of the beneficiaries had their origin directly in the communal areas, the pre-existing peasantry expanded its landholdings (Moyo and Yeros 2005, Moyo et al. 2009). Re-peasantisation has therefore been a significant phenomenon of agrarian change under fast-track land reform, with the entry of urban working class elements into the A1 and resettlement schemes, leading to the growth of a class of new petty commodity producers, which now account for 93.7 percent of total new farming establishments (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

There is substantial class differentiation within the peasantry, some of which is concealed *inter alia* by agro-ecological variation in sizes of land entitlements, off-farm incomes and other local processes of economic and political power-building reflected in inequalities in assets and influences over access to agricultural resources. The ‘better-off peasantry’, which historically comprised less than 10 percent of the peasantry in communal areas (Moyo 1995, Maast 1996, Cousins et al. 1993, Moyo and Yeros 2005), and is mainly based on their employment of substantial non-family labour and better access to remittances compared to other peasants and the remaining landless, has persisted. Under both adverse and positive economic conditions, peasant differentiation is expected to continue, as is the operation of informal land markets, within communal and newly redistributed areas, due to differentiated access to labour, remittances and land.

Small and middle capitalist farmers, which include pre-existing small-scale commercial farmers created during the colonial period and the ‘new’ black commercial farmers created through post-independence allocations towards building indigenous commercial farms, as well as the bulk of the A2 fast-track beneficiaries, expanded dramatically by about 300 percent. The ‘small capitalist’ farms range between 30 and 50 ha, depending on natural region, while ‘middle capitalist’ farms range between 50 and 150 ha, again depending on natural region (see Figure 4). A renewed ‘merchant path’ of agrarian social relations has emerged as seen by the increased number of urban professionals, the petty-bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and private sector managers occupying about 20 percent of the acquired land. These small- and middle-sized capitalist farmers are however blurred by their differentiated levels of capital intensification and use of hired labour compared to own family labour. It is important to examine closely the extent and emerging pattern of access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of labour use</th>
<th>No. of households</th>
<th>% of HH</th>
<th>Hired in</th>
<th>Average labour used (No. of persons)</th>
<th>Hired out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low^1</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>64.67</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>3.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium^2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High^3</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>25.99</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>12.87</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2089</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Household utilises family labour in combination with part-time labour hired in; (2) Household hires in one full-time worker plus some part-time workers; (3) Household hires in at least two full-time workers plus some part-time workers; (4) Not statistically different across labour classes.
by old and newly formed farming units to necessary farming infrastructure, as these partly influence the character, pace and direction of ongoing changes in agrarian relations.

There is an ongoing reconfiguration of the competing categories (of small producers and medium-sized capitalist farmers) given that some of the middle farmers have gained access to state subsidised means of production (inputs, credit and machinery), and because of their better contacts and information, they have had greater influence on the policy-making process (Moyo and Yeros 2005). These small-to medium-sized farmers are broadly spread out among the provinces, with Mashonaland having created larger numbers of small farmers compared to Matabeleland.

At the same time, the land reform downsized and retained large-scale commercial farms by reducing their overall numbers, particularly among whites, and by reducing their average landholding sizes. Large capitalist farms range from between 300 and 500 ha in the higher potential regions to 1,500 ha in the drier areas, while corporate farms range in size from 1,500 to over 5,000 hectares. Altogether there are now a total of about 1,500 large scale capitalist farmers with average landholdings hovering around 1,000 hectares. These comprise black and white large-scale individual farmers, most of whom retained land through fast track and through an indigenous farm settlement scheme. If we included those with over 300 hectares then there are close to 3,000 new large capitalist farmers today (see Figure 3 and Table 6).8

About eight percent of the large-scale farms are black owned, although their average land size is less than 500 hectares, and most of these farms are in the poorer agro-ecological regions of Matabeleland, Midlands and Masvingo (see Table 6). This category of large-scale farms was augmented by over 217 A2 (black) farms covering just over half a million hectares since 2001. There is a wide differentiation among these farmers, with over 81 percent of them holding farms of between 1,500 and

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Table 6. Remaining LSCF white and black large farms (in 2009)1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Black owned</th>
<th>White owned</th>
<th>A2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>Avg. size (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>81,125</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>70,675</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39,327</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>106,890</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10,663</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>41,614</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>86,069</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>94,268</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>530,631</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author from MLRR (2009).
Notes: (1) We estimate that another 150 to 200 large-scale farmers (black and white) are not adequately captured by the existing data sources.

8Approximately, a quarter of the remaining large scale farms are registered as private companies.
3,000 hectares, while only 14 farmers (six percent of the group) hold farms greater than 4,000 hectares in size (see Figure 2, Figure 3, and Table 6). It is among these farms, those with the best access to economic and political resources, where the phenomenon of farm enlargement and multiple farm ownership has been most prevalent, and where cronyism might be adduced.

The large estate farming sector, which mostly comprises land which was not expropriated by the state for redistribution, amounts to about 240 farms covering over 1.4 million hectares, or about five percent of the agricultural land. The sector is comprised of private agro-industrial estates largely owned by transnational firms (TNCs), state farming estates owned by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), large-scale farms whose landowners are protected by Bilateral

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9In 2000, agricultural land legalistically refers to the 11.7 million hectares of LSCF, although in practice the 16.4 million hectares of the Communal Areas are functionally agricultural lands, bringing the entire area of Zimbabwe’s agricultural land to 28.1 million hectares.
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs), and extensive conservancies created by amalgamating numerous former large-scale commercial farms now used for eco-tourism. This also includes the large estates owned by public trusts (see Table 4).

The majority of the TNCs’ agro-industrial estates are owned by transnational firms of South African origin (e.g. Tongaat Hullett Limited) involved in sugar production mainly for export. These are followed by those owned by conglomerates involving mainly white Zimbabwean and British capital, such as Tanganda Tea Company and Ariston Holdings Limited, which are involved in tea and coffee. The foreign-owned BIPPAs, covering over half a million hectares, overlap with the transnational farms. Over 53 (19 percent) of them ranged in size from 2,000 to over 50,000 hectares, although 70 of the farms (25 percent) were below 300 hectares in size. Perhaps over half of these are being acquired for redistribution. Nonetheless, in overall terms of numbers of farms and area, the proportion of the BIPPA farms amounts to less than two percent of the entire LSCF sector. There are eight extremely large conservancies covering over 950,000 hectares within five provinces (Table 7). It is notable however that over 20,000 ‘illegal settlers’ were still occupying about 10 percent of these lands in 2008. However, most of this land (about 711,020 hectares) has since been acquired and redistributed, leaving about 247,364 hectares by 2010 (see Table 7).

State farms have remained central to Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure since the 1960s; about 10 of these were in place by 1980. Most of the state land was alienated by the colonial state from indigenous populations; some of the agricultural lands and forests were converted into freehold titles owned by the state, while some communal lands were converted into leasehold properties managed (and/or owned) by the state. Before the fast track land reform the state’s ARDA farmed on 20 large-scale estates as a wholly state-owned private corporation. The ARDA estates were intended to promote agricultural ‘development’, but have tended to be run on a ‘commercial’ basis. Most of them were highly capitalised, especially with irrigation resources, and were mandated to produce ‘strategic’ commodities, including those which were being imported (see Moyo forthcoming-a). By 2006 ARDA had increased its farms to 24 (see Table 8) covering over 115,601 hectares.

Table 7. Remaining conservancies by province (in 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservancy</th>
<th>Before FTLRP</th>
<th>After FTLRP</th>
<th>Resettled land</th>
<th>Resettlements status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Save valley</td>
<td>233,057</td>
<td>167,805</td>
<td>65,252</td>
<td>A1/ARDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiredzi River</td>
<td>40,056</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>35,045</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malilangwe</td>
<td>37,332</td>
<td>37,332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubiana</td>
<td>87,240</td>
<td>33,890</td>
<td>53,350</td>
<td>125 A1/72 A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubi</td>
<td>246,752</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>244,752</td>
<td>RDC/168 A1/3A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwaai</td>
<td>159,614</td>
<td>159,614</td>
<td></td>
<td>A1/A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>149,523</td>
<td>149,523</td>
<td></td>
<td>A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>958,384</td>
<td>247,364</td>
<td>711,020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement 2010 data.
Notes: \(^{1}\)Rural District Council.
By 2009 ARDA had been negotiating with local white capitalist firms (notably MACDOM Investments [PVT] Ltd) to lease out around 50,000 hectares of these lands on 20-year ‘build, operate and transfer’ (BOT) agreements to grow wheat, maize, soya beans and sugarcane (Moyo forthcoming-a). A number of communal area occupiers of this land were deemed ‘illegal’ and evicted in 2010. Other state parastatals, such as the Cold Storage Commission, National Railways of Zimbabwe, local authorities, and security forces still own some large tracts of land, which they had before 1999, whose utilisation and investment arrangements are discussed elsewhere (Moyo forthcoming-a). The land owned by these parastatals however decreased from 256,435 hectares in 1999 to 179,944 hectares in 2010 as some of the farms, particularly those owned by NRZ (57 percent), CSC (37 percent) and local authorities (28 percent), were acquired and redistributed during the FTLRP.

The changed and changing agrarian structure discussed in this section suggests the potential for a significantly broadened home market based on the differentiated consumption and production of the peasants, medium-scale and larger black capitalist farmers, and an interrelated process of agro-industrial re-organisation. Currently, this trajectory continues to rely on cheap labour and represents a new functional dualism, particularly if it succeeds in re-entrenching an extroverted pattern of accumulation, as it now appears. Agrarian structural change has opened up diverse, ‘productive’ and ‘non-racial’ paths to rural social transformation, even though aspects of the re-division of land may still be contested.

Has agriculture been ‘destroyed’ or ‘transformed’?

Although the Zimbabwean economy at independence was relatively semi-industrialized, it remained in a disarticulated pattern of accumulation. Agriculture was pivotal, and contributed 40 percent of GDP and exports, and employed 70 percent of the workforce (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989, Yeros 2002). The inherited unequal, tri-

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10It is reported that Garahwa (Chipinge) Communal Area residents had occupied this land and were essentially reclaiming it from ARDA, but that ARDA and some local chiefs and leaders had agreed for ARDA to develop land.
modal farming system comprised differentiated farming classes tied to industrial interests wholly-owned by the local white minority and foreign capital, under monopoly conditions, with the former controlling approximately two-thirds of national income. The Rhodesian settler colonial state had sought to turn the peasantry into full-time industrial and mining workers disconnected from the land (Yeros 2002), while allowing for 'subsistence-based social reproduction' of the black migrant labourers and their families in the labour reserves. Uneven allocation of economic resources (public and private) towards white farming areas, supported by an import substitution industrialisation, entrenched the ascendancy of large scale farming and its monopolisation of high value production. These social relations of production induced the ‘sale’ of cheap and ‘semi-bonded’ black labour among a growing landless population (Yeros 2002). These policies restricted the peasantry’s social reproduction and accumulation processes. Petty-commodity production in the communal areas, and especially unwaged female labour, subsidised the social reproduction of male labour-power on mines and farms. Neither a settled industrial proletariat nor a viable peasantry were established, but a workforce in motion, straddling communal lands, white farms, mines, and industrial workplaces (the ‘semi-proletariat’) emerged, aggregating peasant-worker households, differentiated by gender and ethno-regional divisions (Yeros 2002). These features define the dynamics of class, race and nation (Moyo and Yeros 2005) and visions of agrarian reform.

Zimbabwe’s agricultural system had suffered from economic liberalisation since the late 1980s. The absolute volume of cereals produced was declining from the late 1980s (Andersson 2007), and maize production slumped significantly during the 2002–03 Southern Africa-wide drought (Moyo 2011, FAO 2008). Such longer term dynamics must be taken into account in any appraisal of changed patterns of agriculture. From the 1990s until 2001, the Zimbabwean government had abandoned the policy of controlling staple and other agricultural commodities. This move was intended to stabilize prices and supplies, in the belief that a liberalized market would achieve efficient prices and transactions between producers and consumers. The state’s retreat in the 1990s from financing other non-agricultural aspects of rural development, such as various social welfare and other consumption transfers to the poor, was accompanied by market pricing and wage repression. This led to income deflation and agricultural demand compression (Prabhat Patnaik 2008) and, as a result of declining production, limited the sources of state revenues. Livelihoods were now closely tied to the wider economic deflationary policies from the 1990s, wherein disparate peasant ‘diversification’ strategies meant multiple labour provision with minor income rewards, albeit with farming playing a pivotal role.

Zimbabwe’s agrarian question thus centrally concerns a transformation of the settler dominated agrarian and ‘industrial’ society, which was based on racially and socially inequitable access to economic and natural resources and territorially segregated socio-economic endeavours, towards the development of the human capabilities of the poor, most of whom live in rural areas or stride between these and urban ghettos. Agrarian reform measures would need to re-orient public support towards broader based rural development and address the entrenched unequal political and economic power relations in the countryside.

Agricultural production of Zimbabwe’s 15 main commodities, in terms of their value and volumes produced by most farmers, had by 2009 fallen below the pre-2000 average levels, in a highly heterogeneous manner (see Table 9). This reflects the
differentiated forms of financing and marketing of agriculture and the priorities of
the differentiated classes of farmers in the new agrarian structure within the diverse
land use potentials under varied agro-ecological and market conditions. Agricultural
production in volume terms had declined by about 50 percent in 2008 – by closer to
60 percent in foreign exchange or general value terms – although among the 15 key
agricultural commodities, output declines varied from between less than 10 percent
to 70 percent of the 1990s average levels of production. The production of the main
food grains (maize and wheat) declined variably, to between 35 percent and 65
percent of past output levels.

Table 9. Agricultural production trends (000 tonnes): 1990s average versus 2000s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main foods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize (% change)</td>
<td>1,685.6</td>
<td>1,058.8</td>
<td>1,484.8</td>
<td>952.6</td>
<td>575.0</td>
<td>1,322.66</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(−37.2)</td>
<td>(−11.9)</td>
<td>(−43.5)</td>
<td>(−74.2)</td>
<td>(−21.5)</td>
<td>(−13.9)</td>
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<td>Wheat</td>
<td>248.4</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>241.9</td>
<td>149.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>164.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(−50.7)</td>
<td>(−2.6)</td>
<td>(−40.0)</td>
<td>(−86.0)</td>
<td>(−83.3)</td>
<td>(−5.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>164.8</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>163.9</td>
<td>120.0</td>
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<td>193.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(−31.5)</td>
<td>(−0.6)</td>
<td>(−27.2)</td>
<td>(−51.4)</td>
<td>(17.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edible dry beans</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.0)</td>
<td>(305.7)</td>
<td>(471.7)</td>
<td>(28.3)</td>
<td>(224.5)</td>
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<td>Groundnuts (shelled)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>131.5</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>230.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(−2.2)</td>
<td>(17.8)</td>
<td>(54.7)</td>
<td>(119.1)</td>
<td>(168.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oilseeds</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>84.2</td>
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<td>(−55.6)</td>
<td>(−24.3)</td>
<td>(21.0)</td>
<td>(−47.9)</td>
<td>(−24.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−58.9)</td>
<td>(−59.3)</td>
<td>(−37.6)</td>
<td>(−86.7)</td>
<td>(−66.1)</td>
<td>(−72.1)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key export</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>198.3</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>177.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−52.8)</td>
<td>(−77.6)</td>
<td>(−60.2)</td>
<td>(−64.8)</td>
<td>(−57.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>207.9</td>
<td>235.0</td>
<td>226.4</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>220.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(−23.2)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(13.1)</td>
<td>(9.0)</td>
<td>(25.1)</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
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<td><strong>Estate crops</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>438.9</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(14.4)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(−20.5)</td>
<td>(−41.0)</td>
<td>(−20.3)</td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
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<td>Tea</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(107.5)</td>
<td>(107.5)</td>
<td>(27.4)</td>
<td>(−21.7)</td>
<td>(34.9)</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>(−4.8)</td>
<td>(−84.5)</td>
<td>(−91.7)</td>
<td>(−90.5)</td>
<td>(−96.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other crops</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables &amp; Melons</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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Note: Agricultural production data used in this table is slightly different from other estimates we have used before due to continuous verification and updating of the variable data.
Overall cereal output dropped sharply from 2001 to 2003, then stalled at low levels from 2004 to 2006, only to drop sharply again during the hyper-inflation around 2007. On average, cereal production levels in the 2000s were between 30 percent and 65 percent of national requirements, depending on whether it was a drought year. On average 65 percent of the 1990s levels of average production were achieved, suggesting less of a collapse, and longer term processes of production decline.

Thus during the fast track period, agricultural production declined less in the communal and resettled areas, despite the adverse economic conditions. Especially resilient were cotton, groundnuts and beans, with declines of less than 15 percent in non-drought years. Even the maize produced, largely by small farmers, comprised around 65 percent of domestic requirements during most non-drought years, and was barely 15 percent below the average levels of maize production during the 1990s (Moyo 2011). There was also an upsurge in the production of some critical food crops, such as dry edible beans (see Table 10), as well as of small stock rearing.

The differential propensities of the new farmers to access basic agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers and chemicals, played a critical part in shaping the production mix and productivity. The smaller farmers, who depend mostly on rainfed farming, had the least access to the limited agricultural finance and inputs provided by the state. With limited personal savings and access to remittances, they were the most affected in terms of areas planted and productivity. Fertiliser use declined mostly among crops dominated by small farmers such as maize and cotton, which accounted for most of the cropped land areas. The area dominated by crops formerly grown by large farmers (e.g. wheat, tobacco and oilseeds) had declined and thus used less fertiliser. The agricultural productivity crisis thus mostly affected the small and medium farms. Maize and cotton yields in Zimbabwe declined most, with small producer maize yields below one tonne per hectare (FAO 2008, 2009) and middle farmers yields below three tonnes per hectare, in comparison to the dryland potential of ten tonnes per hectare (Rukuni et al. 2009).

The smaller producers have had less access to the available agricultural and machinery inputs, including the little provided through state subsidises and donors. Private contract farming and commodity merchants dominate agrarian markets, given the reduced fiscal capacity of the state and the so-called illiquidity of the financial sector and absence of investor confidence. The prices realised by the mostly small producers of maize, cotton and some oilseeds are below world prices, although Chinese commodity buying has slightly moderated this. Indeed, China has expanded its role in financing agricultural input imports and commodity exports (e.g. tobacco), filling the financing gap which had been partially left by the flight of European capital (see TIMB 2010).

Contrary to the impression that new farmers were not investing on the new land due to land tenure insecurity and collateral issues, survey data shows that there has been substantial investment (see Table 10). Some agricultural capital stock such as irrigation infrastructure, processing facilities and machinery and equipment that were on the former farms were disabled during the fast track process, and this had had some effect on constraining production levels; however some of the new farmers acquired some of these technologies from former farmers. The importation and manufacture of such facilities declined during the crisis years, although the state created money to import these from 2006.
Table 10. Investments made by farmers – qualified gross table (excluding shelter).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments made by farmers</th>
<th>District of study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chipinge</td>
<td>Chiredzi</td>
<td>Goromonzi</td>
<td>Kwekwe</td>
<td>Mangwe</td>
<td>Zvimba</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Water &amp; irrigation facilities</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm structures</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm equipment &amp; machinery</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>137</td>
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<td>Plantations &amp; orchards</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental works</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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</table>

Notes: *N = 2,089.
While, the level of agricultural tractorisation in Zimbabwe (at 75 per km²) also varies by sub-sector, and is relatively low compared to South Africa, cropped areas of grains did not decline, except for wheat because of its specific mechanisation deficits. However, the area cropped to tobacco, oilseeds and wheat did decline. The new middle farmer was thus the most constrained by tillage capacity. But, many communal farmers (40 percent) and land reform beneficiaries do not have oxen or farm machinery, or sufficient resources to acquire these. But they did invest somewhat (Moyo et al. 2009).

From 2003, the state mounted an extensive scheme to promote agricultural mechanisation. But it was the medium to large new farmers who got the lion’s share of this. A range of farming inputs (e.g. bulls) and motorised equipment and transport were supplied. Private investments into productive assets (e.g. irrigation facilities, electrification, farm structures such as barns, animal sheds, granaries and fences, etc.) and machinery and equipment (e.g. tractors, dyers, grinding mills, etc.) remained low. The inadequacy of investments into rural and agricultural infrastructures, such as irrigation facilities (including dams, field equipment, etc), rural transport facilities (such as roads, bridges and ports, vehicles), and bulk food storage (and grain reserve) facilities as well as ancillary services such as electricity, have also tended to limit the expansion of agricultural production and marketing.

This pattern of low levels of mechanization, fertilizer and pesticide utilization suggests a regression in the agricultural technological transition, and in part accounts for the decline in crop productivity. Yet it was not merely the inadequacy of the new farmers which limited access to and utilisation of these technologies. Agricultural merchants, agro-industrial input suppliers and finance capital had a critical role to play in these shortages (Moyo 2011). Although this was ascribed to the absence of ‘investor confidence’, the ‘risks of doing business in Zimbabwe’ and the absence of land tenure security, both international isolation and sanctions and the retreat of capital played critical roles in engendering this downward spiral.

This systemic source of agrarian de-accumulation and the incapacity of the state to support agriculture through the national budget led the state to resort to extensive ‘quasi-fiscal’ funding in general, and substantially for agriculture. From then on, the government attempted to implement a heterodox macro-economic plan based on a range of policy instruments: control of foreign exchange, imports, and exports; the regulation of interest rates; the targeting of credit to essential industries; the subsidising of basic commodities and utilities; and expansive money supply (M3) through printing. The policy also entailed extensive agricultural commodity pricing and marketing controls, public input supply and price regulations, managed allocations of subsidised foreign exchange to farmers and agro-industries (for seeds and fertiliser inputs and purchase of outputs), state support for irrigation facilities, and livestock support. The heterodox plan did not seem to be adequately coordinated, especially in relation to food production and exports, and it soon faced implementation problems, including the general evasion of the controls (e.g. in maize marketing) and countervailing ‘underground’ trade and petty businesses.

Excessive money printing drove hyperinflation which reinforced this ‘informalisation’ process, alongside the corruption of some in authority. A variety of economic and agricultural policy measures and schemes intended to support (and protect) the new and existing farmers and/or small producers in the context of economic decline and falling agricultural production were incrementally instituted.
from 2001. In a loosely coordinated agrarian reform programme, an increased range
of state interventions (including subsidies for inputs and credit and foreign exchange
allocations to agro-industry) were instituted. Various farm input support measures
were deployed, in addition to other sectoral interventions such as the supply of
cheaply priced fuel, electricity and other inputs, and credit to agro-industry. The
strategy included resurrecting state-owned enterprises to direct the recovery and
diversification of trade and investment to the East. Everyone engaged in speculative
activity and short-term profiteering through the informalisation of business activity
and the creation of parallel markets (as opposed to black markets) and systematic
linkages between large, formal businesses and small, informal enterprises (see Moyo
and Yeros 2007a).

Some consider the above declines in agricultural production to be evidence of an
irretrievable collapse which required the land redistribution to be reversed and
private property re-introduced in order to leverage erstwhile sources of financing
agriculture (Richardson 2005, Tupy 2007). Despite the political infeasibility and
social undesirability of reinstating large scale export-oriented farming to its former
extent – given its potential negative effects on small rural producers – they argue for
the abolishment of the new land ownership framework, wrongly characterised as a
system of subsistence plots (Tupy 2007), combined with a policy focused on extensive
trade liberalization (Tupy 2007). Particularistic stereotypes of ‘viable’ agricultural
production and productivity models in Southern Africa (Cousins and Scoones 2010)
dergird their dubious arguments supporting a junker-type path of agrarian
‘accumulation’ based on scale economies to the neglect of the imperatives for social
reproduction. These views in turn rest on the assumed spectacular performance of
agriculture from before independence to 1999, ignoring the recent recovery of the
production of maize, tobacco, cotton and sugar (see Table 10 and Ministry of
Finance Budget Speech 2010).

Agrarian politics and neoliberal reformism
The prospect for progressive agrarian reform in Zimbabwe is promising although
this has been circumscribed by a combination of forces, including the recent strains
in the relations between local capital and the state apparatus, and the reaction of
local and foreign capital to the replacement of the economically conservative and
politically reactionary former landowners, who have retained strong linkages with
transnational capital. A substantial portion of the agrarian estates and large
capitalist farmers remain, and significant sections of capital (agrarian, merchant,
industrial and finance, and even retail) also retain substantial influence on the
‘markets’, while donor politics continues to exert influence on agrarian policy
realities.

Agrarian politics after the peak of FTLRP land transfers in 2004 shifted from the
inter-class and intra-class (white–black) contests over access to land towards
competing claims for and access to public resources for agrarian accumulation and
social reproduction. Middle and large capitalist farmers, in political alliance under
the ideology of ‘indigenisation’, envisioned their role in the differentiated agrarian
sector as focused on the production of high-value commodities (including exports)
such as tobacco, potatoes, and beef), while peasants would produce labour intensive
exports such as cotton and cheap-wage food such as maize grains for domestic
consumption. Agrarian conflicts had by 2006 accentuated over access to the limited
public resources (including subsidised inputs, infrastructure, water, energy, credit),
as well as over commodity market controls.

Initially the emergence of a new and differentiated black agrarian bourgeoisie,
linked to the ruling party and in pole positions of the state apparatus, was at the
centre of agrarian and heterodox policy formulation (Moyo and Yeros 2009). The
policy’s limits soon forced them to seek normalisation with capital, realising the need
for ‘order’ (political and economic stability) as a prerequisite for accumulation. They
articulated an array of demands through formally constituted professional lobbies,
farmer associations, and party factions, as well as through less visible forms of
politics, both within and without the political parties. However, this new black
bourgeoisie struggled to achieve organisational and strategic coherence in alliance
with pre-existing capital until 2007. The reintroduction of neoliberal policy in 2008
has led to a significant but partial process of reorganization of capital across the
economic sectors, with the erstwhile and nascent agrarian bourgeoisies joining
forces, economically and politically, particularly with the transport, retail, and
finance (new indigenous banking institutions) sectors (Moyo and Yeros 2009). They
appear to have a newly found recognition of the significance of agricultural
production and distribution activities for their own reproduction and accumulation.
There is likely to be ongoing reconfiguration of these competing classes. The middle
capitalist farmers, including the remaining large units, retain their advantage in the
land bidding and accumulation processes by virtue of their better access to other
means of production (credit and technology), to contacts and information, and to
the policy-making process itself. This differentiation has the potential to trigger new
agrarian class conflicts over uneven control of access to land, capital, labour and
trade and other policy issues.

Class contestation soon focused on the question of whether vesting the former
freehold agricultural land in the state, and allocating it through leasehold and
permissory land tenures to beneficiaries, offered secure tenure and ensured access to
private credit, including protection from arbitrary dispossession by the state, and
consequently whether this constrained agricultural productivity. This contestation is
related to intra-elite land disputes, including over the holding of multiple and
‘enlarged’ or oversized farms, and land bidding over access to land held by small
producers, who are threatened with eviction by the technocracy of replanning and
privatization, as well as over the control of natural resources (such as water,
woodlands and wildlife). A policy coalition lobbying for the conversion of public
agricultural land tenures (through leases and permits) to freehold title or private
property, for ‘free’ agricultural inputs to A2 farmers and more liberalised commodity
markets, and to maintain the cheap agricultural labour system, has been in the
making. This involves new and aspiring farmers, banks, some intellectuals and
middle class elements of civil society, and some government and donor agency
bureaucrats. There is also a salient racially defined intra-class struggle between the
emergent capitalist farming sector and established and new sections of agri-business,
including the inputs supply and agro-processing industries (both domestic and
foreign), and merchant capitalists, over the control of ‘contract farming’. The latter
which is akin to ‘share-cropping’ appears to have replaced agricultural credit
in scale, given the financial isolation of Zimbabwe (i.e. through a range of
‘sanctions’).

In this context, party political mobilisation and fragmentation is largely a petty-
bourgeois accumulation contest. Politically, the leadership of the ruling party had
reigned in its radical elements, especially among lower-echelon war veterans, by 2005 (Moyo and Yeros 2007a). Power struggles within the ruling party have shifted from the radical nationalist political unity associated with the fast-track period to the re-emergence of internal factionalism associated with succession fights. Ideological differences across political parties are either superficial or opportunistic, although Zanu-PF still retains a focus on its peasant constituency. By 2005, factionalism had degenerated along the Shona-Ndebele ethnic line within the MDC over electoral tactics, although ideological differences were absent in this conflict since all the factions are linked directly to imperialist forces (Moyo and Yeros 2007a), despite their alliance with the urban-based trade union movement (ZCTU). Despite this, ethnicity has in general not yet degenerated into an ethno-chauvinist spiral, and its effects on the land reform and agrarian change are limited. Since the 2008 election period, the economic liberalisation, which reversed the heterodox economic policies, has not yet elicited any serious ideological confrontation among the ruling political elites, except for mild differences over the tactics of implementing the new indigenisation policy. In this context, the working-class constituency has not mobilised an anti-neoliberal platform nor a spirited defense of farm labour, partly due to its material and ideological cooptation by donor funding.

Since the GoZ abandoned structural adjustment in 1996, its relations with the West have been polarised, leading to major contradictions with capital. The Bretton Woods loans and other forms of aid were cut, Western capital retreated, and a sanctions regime was elaborated, while material support was given to the opposition (see Elich 2002, Mamdani 2008). This played a critical role in the wider economic collapse of Zimbabwe, and in the shift in the correlation of forces around agrarian radicalism and neoliberal inspired regime change. The GoZ elite power-sharing pact continues to face pressures to follow the Bretton Woods’ tutelage to re-subordinate Zimbabwe to parasitical international financiers and corporations, including South African capital. This is undermining Zimbabwe’s remaining industrial capacity, which faces extreme import competition, thereby off-loading the costs of recovery onto the peasants and workers (Moyo and Yeros 2009). The Zimbabwean crisis and normalisation conditionalities have both constrained the implementation of radical agrarian reform measures and are leading to the re-introduction of a socially dysfunctional and extroverted agrarian change.

A developmental agrarian reform strategy requires autonomous policy space, a new conciliatory foundation and effective planning bureaucracies (Edigheji 2006). Since 2009, the Inclusive Government has not secured the requisite willingness, orientation, and capacity to effect the desired interventionist agrarian policies, nor has it effectively mobilised populist social forces in support of egalitarian agrarian reform in favour of domestic accumulation, expanded employment and a growing home market. The retreat from intervention in financial and agricultural markets, and agro-processing, promises to undermine this potential.

This is not surprising, given that Zimbabwe’s land reform did not lead to the comprehensive dissolution of the political power of large agrarian capital, which operates in tandem with international capital. Furthermore, the state apparatus has been overwhelmed by middle class black ‘empowerment’ demands, reflecting the qualitative shifts in the nature of state power, which the new farmers are constituent parts of and directly lobby. Radical popular agrarian reforms would require the mobilisation of social forces which represent the working peoples, including small producers in the countryside and towns and various forms of labour.
Conclusion

Although the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was built upon two decades of lacklustre land reforms, the cumulative outcome of three decades of land reforms was redistributive in terms of the physical scale and breadth of access to agricultural land. Most of the large-scale private agricultural lands owned by the minority white large-scale farmers and foreign capital in large estates was expropriated and allocated largely free of charge to mainly poor non-landed beneficiaries, as well as to numerous ‘middle class’ and some ‘black elite’ beneficiaries. A substantial number of the agro-industrial estates, conservancies, foreign owned farms and a few white LSCFs were retained, although they are outnumbered by and have less land than the small- to medium-scale farms.

Despite the outcome being generally progressive, a key regressive feature is the substantial enlargement of the upper middle and elite class beneficiaries, most of whom call for even larger land allocations under freehold tenure. The key second generation of land questions that are still to be resolved include the issue of redistributing the remaining multiple and oversized landholdings to redress the exclusion of some sections of society, particularly local landless peoples and women, especially in some provinces. Although land concentration now operates on the margins of the land distribution structure, it highlights the potential inequalities that the agrarian reform project is facing. Nonetheless, the overall outcome contradicts common perceptions that the FTLRP was not redistributive and mainly benefited black elites and cronies of the ruling Zanu PF. Indeed, the extent of redistribution was wide enough to significantly alter property relations in terms of relative land distribution and the socialisation of property rights, in turn triggering dynamic changes in agrarian social relations. It seems that the bi-modal land reform policy had become hegemonic, even among land movement leaders, despite their resistances, such that the class bias of the outcome was conceded to on the grounds that it would be contained through land ceilings, ‘cost-recovery’ measures and taxation. Yet the state has not implemented this due to internal opposition to it among the elites, and this evokes residual land struggles.

Agrarian production relations have been restructured by broadening the food and export production base, although this is characterised by critical inequalities in access to agricultural inputs, public subsidies and finance, contingent on an unfolding social differentiation among the beneficiaries within the bi-modal agrarian reform policy. The productivity of the small and medium farm sector grew slowly since 2000 as compared to previous levels, but the food production base has expanded and has shown signs of increased growth since 2009. The new middle farmers, stimulated by returning and new agrarian merchants, lean towards producing export commodities, such as tobacco and others. Production levels remain below expectations, largely due to the shortages of fertilisers, irrigation facilities and draft power arising from reduced domestic agro-industrial input supply capacities and foreign exchange constraints on imports. A relatively broader interclass class framework of inequalities in access to land, control of public resources and influence over labour policies is emerging.

Undoubtedly, fewer than expected farm workers gained land rights. Freed from depending on the few LSCF employers, farm labour is now employed by a diverse range of smaller farm employers and in non-farm self-employment and paid activities. But the practice of compound farm labour tenancy and low wages have
reproduced the cheap labour relations of the past. In general, however, the political environment for rural farm labour has also been relatively opened up by the removal of the monopoly of the few LSCF employers, and some farm workers have been resisting cheap labour conditions through various labour provision strategies, including the desertion of poorly paid work.

Nonetheless, the Zimbabwe experience illustrates that even under neoliberalism, the potential for radical land reform exists, especially where land ownership grievances relate to minority racial and foreign dominance in addition to class difference. This is particularly relevant for other former settler-colonial countries. Although Zimbabwe’s radicalised land reform was fuelled by complex factors (Moyo and Yeros 2007a, 2007b), the realisation of a relatively redistributive outcome needs to be examined in terms of the wider socio-political nuances of the national question, compared to standard formulations based on the experiences of past revolutionary forces of change (see Borras 2005). The reforms in Zimbabwe entailed the mobilisation of both popular direct action for land reform and an expropriation policy, and the state sought to meet both the popular demands for land and those of the middle classes, the bureaucracy and national elites. The redistributive outcome, however, entailed critical class- and gender-based distributional biases, reflecting unequal class-based patriarchal power.

This class bias, however, also queries the over-generalisations about the neo-patrimonial nature of African political regimes and agricultural policy processes (see also deGrassi 2008). Related perspectives made the claim that cronyism was dominant in Zimbabwe’s land reform. Instead, the outcome suggests that a deliberate class-based and ethno-regional balancing of access to land emerged, largely through the decentralisation of most land allocations within the neighbourhoods where expropriations occurred, and was supervised by ‘central command’ state structures, as well as the socially mixed (in class, ethnic and gender terms) land movements and war veterans’ structures (Moyo 2001, 2005, Moyo and Yeros 2007a). The ethno-regional pressures from some central and local elites to exclude those who did not belong to the localities were not universally accepted. Moreover, while the outcome does suggest that urbanites influenced the land reform allocation processes, it also suggests that they did not automatically dominate the beneficiary selection process, as would be expected by notions of ‘urban bias’ in African policy processes. Moreover, since capital was not totally ousted in Zimbabwe’s land reform and alternative sources of financing Zimbabwe’s agrarian reform have been limited, internal class contradictions have enabled (politically unaccountable) international capital to reinforce the emerging unequal agrarian relations, using deregulated market mechanisms tied to the unequal world trade regime.

References


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